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The technique of appending substantive provisions to appro-
priations bills has become a favorite tool of the legislative trade in
recent years. Congress has employed appropriations riders to dic-
tate the outcome of public policy issues ranging from abortion to
oil development in pristine wilderness areas. Riders have been used
with particularly destructive effect to circumvent long-standing en-
vironmental policies, especially those involving the use of natural
resources and public lands. In many cases, the policies affected
were the result of decades of activity in Congress and in the courts,
and retain broad public and legislative support. Appropriations rid-
ers have also allowed these significant changes in policy to be
made without public input or legislative accountability. The policy
changes implemented through the appropriations process would
likely not survive the scrutiny of natural resources committees and
full floor debate. Appropriations riders have mandated dramatic
changes in these carefully brokered policies, with highly disruptive
effects on the long-term management and the sustainability of the
public lands1 and natural resources.
This Article explores several recent environmental riders and
proposed riders, and their likely long-term effects. In particular, it
focuses on the effects of the 1995 Rescissions Act 2 -specifically
* U.S. Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division; L.L.M.,
George Washington University, 1996; J.D., University of South Dakota, 1990; B.A.,
Morningside College, 1985. Paper submitted in partial satisfaction of the degree of Master
of Laws. This Article represents only the views of the author.
1. The term "public lands" includes lands managed by federal agencies with
jurisdiction over natural resources: the Department of Agriculture National Forest Service
and the Department of Interior Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"), Fish and Wildlife
Service, and National Park Service.
2. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at
Oklahoma City, and Rescissions Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194 (1995)
[hereinafter Rescissions Act].
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the Emergency Timber Salvage Rider 3 -on the management of natu-
ral resources within federal forest lands in the Pacific Northwest.
In an attempt to provide relief to communities dependent on log-
ging of public lands, this rider undermined decades of land man-
agement planning and overturned policies developed through ex-
tended litigation and negotiations between industry, environmental-
ists, state and local governments, and the executive branch of the
federal government. The cumulative environmental effects of the
rider are likely to persist long after the "emergency" indicated by
the rider has passed. Yet, because of the abbreviated nature of the
appropriations process, neither the public nor the legislators who
voted on the timber rider were aware of its potentially far-reaching
consequences.
This Article argues that the appropriations process is an ill-
suited vehicle for formulating major changes in policy and estab-
lishing national priorities. Indeed, the repeated abuse of the process
to force executive action and, curtail judicial oversight has created
a serious crisis. This Article examines several possible remedies,
including the possibility of stricter judicial scrutiny of legislation
passed by rider, as well as the enactment of line-item veto legisla-
tion and legislation that would give congressional germaneness
rules (limiting the subject matter of provisions that can be ap-
pended to a bill) the force of law. Such legislation may be a step
in the right direction; however, it may raise constitutional chal-
lenges, and, in any event, none of these options would go far
enough to prevent future legislative subterfuge. Moreover, as a
practical matter, the fact that an interest is deemed a "right" does
not necessarily preclude erosion of that right through appropria-
tions riders.
This Article also considers proposals to recognize or create a
constitutional right to sustainable public lands and natural resources,
or a healthful environment, but determines that they are not the
best solution. While such proposals merit further consideration,
value-laden amendments find little support in our constitutional
structure.
Instead, this Article proposes the passage of a constitutional
amendment that prohibits the use of appropriations measures to
enact substantive exemptions or changes in the law. A process-ori-
3. Id. at 240-47.
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ented amendment would inhibit further legislative incursion on the
constitutional checks and balances between political branches. As a
result, important public policy decisions, such as environmental pri-
orities, would be based on full and informed consideration of com-
peting interests and long-term effects. Such an amendment would be
the most effective means of protecting the right to adequate repre-
sentation and deliberative lawmaking, which are at the core of a
democratic, republican government. It would also protect the envi-
ronment from the kinds of rider-based attacks that have become an
all-too-frequent hallmark of the current legislative process.
II. PRESENT PUBLIC LANDS POLICY AND LAWS ARE THE
CULMINATION OF A CENTURY OF DELIBERATION AND RETAIN
BROAD SUPPORT
Today's natural resources laws build upon a century of experi-
ence in managing federal lands and natural resources. The conflict
between extractive, commodity-based uses and the need to preserve
limited natural resources has presented a constant challenge to both
legislative and executive decision makers throughout the twentieth
century. Existing natural resources laws, "the pillars of federal envi-
ronmental law" 4-the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 5
the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), 6 the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"), 7 and the Endangered Spe-
cies Act ("ESA")-represent Congress's considered efforts to re-
solve these conflicts and balance competing interests. NFMA and
FLPMA embody sustained yield and multiple use principles, 9 while
NEPA requires public participation and informed decisionmaking. 10
The ESA establishes substantive protections for endangered and
threatened species of wildlife." Together, these laws ensure con-
4. Victor Sher, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls, and the Demise of Federal Environ-
mental Law, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,469, 10,469 (1990).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1994).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994).
7. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
8. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
9. See id. §§ 528-31, 1600(3), 1604(e), (g)(3), 1611; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(7)-(8),
1712(c)(1).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (9th Cir. 1989).
11. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1).
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sideration of the interrelatedness of natural resources and their
ecosystems, and strive to maintain them for future generations.12
A. Long-Standing Natural Resources Laws Strive to Strike a
Balance between Preservationist and Utilitarian Views
Contemporary land use policies have their roots in forestry
requirements ,enacted near the end of the nineteenth century. In
1891, Congress authorized the President to create forest reserves, 3
and millions of acres of forest lands were subsequently reserved
from western public lands over the next two decades. 14 The Organic
Administration Act of 189715 was the first management directive
for the national forests, and Congress's first statement of the goal
of maintaining a sustained yield from natural resources. It provided
that forest reserves were to be established to secure favorable water
flow conditions and to furnish a continuous timber supply.16 Timber
harvest was limited to "dead, matured, or large growth trees" marked
and designated by a forester.17
Planning became a centerpiece of federal forest management
under Gifford Pinchot's guidance as Chief of the Division of
Forestry, beginning as early as 1898,18 although formal
forest planning was not legislatively required until the mid-
12. See id. § 1604(b),(d)-(e); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c).
13. See The Forest Reserve Act, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (1891) (codified
in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., and 43 U.S.C.), repealed by Act
of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792.
14. Presidents Harrison, Cleveland, and Theodore Roosevelt added over 50 forest
reserves during their administrations. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDER-
SON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 18 n.57 (1987); 1.
William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FROM
RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 15 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993). Not surprisingly,
these extensive withdrawals drew serious criticism from the western citizenry. See id. A
special session of Congress was convened in 1897, resulting in the enactment of the
Organic Administration Act of 1897 ("Organic Act"), ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482, 551 (1994)). Toward the end of the Roosevelt
administration, Congress enacted a rider that barred further executive additions to forest
reserves. See Futrell, supra, at 22.
15. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482, 551.
16. See id. § 475.
17. Id. § 476, repealed by NFMA, id. § 1611.
18. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 19-23; George Coggins, The
Developing Law of Land Use Planning on Federal Lands, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 308,
334 (1990) (detailing origins and current requirements of planning on both forest lands
and other public lands).
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1970s.19 Pinchot's long range plans required data collection, crea-
tion of natural resource inventories, and assessment of management
strategies,20 much as forest plans do today.21 In addition, these plans
provided a strategy to guide individual land use decisions, and
ensured that the sustained yield objectives would be met.22
In the early twentieth century, two countervailing schools of
thought began to develop with respect to management of public
lands: utilitarianism, championed by Gifford Pinchot, and preser-
vationism, associated with John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club.
23
Both sought to preserve forests for future generations, but the
utilitarians promoted sustainable commodity production, while the
preservationists focused on aesthetics and other non-commodity
uses, typically associated with wilderness.24 This conflict, and the
opposing resource management strategies it spawned, continues
today.25
Contemporary management mandates were established during
the 1960s and 1970s, an era during which the preservationist view
took hold.26 The first of these laws was the Multiple-Use, Sus-
19. See Coggins, supra note 18, at 308. The passage of NEPA in 1969 "fore-
shadow[ed] formal land planning mechanisms." Id.
20. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 22-23.
21. See FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712, 1732 (1994); NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
22. See Coggins, supra note 18, at 308, 319-25, 333-37 (discussing past and present
Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") and Forest Service management mandates). "Sus-
tained yield" is defined as "the achievement and maintenance of a high-level annual or
regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the -national forests without
impairment of production of the land" 16 U.S.C. 531(b). See generally WILKINSON &
ANDERSON, supra note 14, at Chapter IV.
23. See Kenneth L. Rosenbaum, Timber, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FROM RESOURCES
TO RECOVERY 387 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993); Futrell, supra note 14, at
20-21.
24. See Rosenbaum, supra note 23, at 387, 390. The Wilderness Society and the
National Wildlife Federation were both formed in 1935 to advance wilderness values and
protect wildlife, respectively. See id.
25. For example, the recent reservation of public lands in Utah raised vastly
divergent viewpoints. Preservationists praised the creation of the Grand Staircase-Esca-
lante National Monument as "visionary" and "a brave and true act," while county officials
and industry representatives labelled it the "most arrogant gesture" ever seen. David
Maraniss, Clinton Acts To Protect Utah Land, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al, A10.
26. Environmental issues were brought to the forefront by a number of widely read
publications; perhaps the most critical example was RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING
(1962). For an important work in the natural resources area, see ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND
COUNTY ALMANAC 236-39 (1966) ("A land.., ethic reflects the existence of an ecological
conscience, and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for the health
of the land:'). In addition, increased access to national and world events through the
media, and the broadcast of photographs of earth from the moon, fostered a new ecological
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tamined-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSY),27 which was unanimously passed
by Congress and added the concept of multiple use to the sustained
yield objective of the Organic Act.28
Critical natural resources laws, which prioritized preservation
and protection over extraction and exploitation, were enacted as
well: the Wilderness Act of 1964,29 the National Historic Preserva-
tion Act in 1966,30 the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act in 1968, 31 the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,32 and the Endangered
Species Act of 1973. 33 Numerous laws specific to Forest Service
and BLM lands were also passed: the Forest and Rangeland Re-
newable Resources Planning Act of 1974, 34 the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, 35 and the National Forest Manage-
ment Act of 1976.36 Together, these statutes built upon lessons
learned over nearly a century of public lands management, striving
to strike a balance between divergent viewpoints and ushering in
a new era of comprehensive, ecologically based planning open to
citizen involvement. 37
B. Despite Recent Polarization, Preservation of the Nation's
Resources Retains Broad Support
The past two decades have witnessed two contrary trends: an
intensified hostility to government control over natural resources,
awareness: "[e]xtraterrestrial exploration... (has given] modern man a unique perspective
on the earth and his natural environment. . . . [We have finally realized that no matter
... how far afield our explorations take us, and no matter how great our vision, we must
always return to earth." Edmund S. Muskie, Environmental Jurisdiction in the Congress
and the Executive, 22 ME. L. REv. 171, 171 (1970).
27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
28. Id. §§ 473-479.
29. Id. §§ 1131-1136.
30. Id. §§ 470-470w-6.
31. Id. §§ 1271-1287.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1994).
33. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687.
35. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1994). BLM lands in Oregon and northern California
are governed by a separate charter that stresses sustained yield management. See 43 U.S.C.
§ 1181a.
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614.
37. These statutes, coupled with the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994), provide a basis for citizen intervention and judicial review
of agency action and strive to balance the perennial conflict between preservationists and
utilitarians. See MUSY, 16 U.S.C. § 475; NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
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and a growing sense of urgency to protect the global environment.
Private property rights proponents have gained momentum through
the Wise Use and Sagebrush Rebellion movements, which advocate
privatization of public lands and a dramatically diminished role for
federal oversight.3 Meanwhile, events such as the 1992 Conference
on the Environment and Development (the "Earth Summit") sig-
nified an international awareness of the relationship between hu-
mankind's future well-being and the protection of the global envi-
ronment.3 9 The Summit "marked the emergence" of the "'central
organizing principle' of the post-Cold War world-namely the task
of protecting the earth's environment while fostering economic
progress, ' 40 and ushered in "a new generation of global treaties
aimed at promoting sustainable economic progress and healing the
relationship between civilization and the fragile ecological system
of the earth. '41
Despite increased polarization between extremists at either
end of the spectrum, public support for progress on environmental
goals has in general remained steadfast.42 This support has encour-
aged continued efforts to resolve differences through compromise
and negotiated solutions. The premier example of a successful
negotiated compromise is the Northwest Forest Plan, which made
major strides toward resolving the decades-long controversy over
the northern spotted owl. 43
38. See Thomas R. Huffman, Legislatures and the Environment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1313, 1326-27 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994). The Wise
Use movement gained strength during the Reagan administration, with the appointment of
James Watt as Secretary of the Interior. See Denis Hayes, Environmental Law and
Millennial Politics, 25 ENVTL. L. REv. 953, 958 (1995) (Wise Use movement continues
to present a "disciplined opposition [to the environmental movement] that displays a robust
pride in being 'anti-environmental."'). For in-depth discussions of this movement, see
Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the
Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847 (1982); John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush
Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980).
39. See AL GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE at xiii-xiv, 180, 183-84 (Plume
ed. 1992).
40. Id. at xv.
41. Id. at xii.
42. See, e.g., Jessica Mathews, Prognosis for the Environment, WASH. POST, Jan.
13, 1997, at A17 (noting that even environmentalists have been surprised by breadth and
strength of public opposition to the Contract With America's anti-environmental provi-
sions); James Gerstenzang, Environmentalists See Attacks by Foes Easing in Congress, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 2, 1997, at A14 (noting that public pressure during the re-election
campaign has made it unlikely that the anti-environmental initiatives of the 104th Congress
will be repeated).
43. The results of these negotiations are contained in U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE
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This spirit of compromise came to an end with the "Republi-
can Revolution" of 1994, as party leaders sought to implement a
"Contract with America" founded in large part on private property
rights." Republican leaders in the 104th Congress made strenuous
efforts to dismantle decades of environmental law.45 When their
proposals to change the law were unsuccessful in regular legislative
channels, 46 riders were attached to appropriations bills.47 Among those
enacted were the salvage timber rider48 and a moratorium on listing
endangered species. 49 Numerous others were proposed, but were
ultimately unsuccessful. 50
ET AL., RECORD OF DECISION (ROD) FOR AMENDMENTS TO FOREST SERVICE AND BUREAU
OF LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING DOCUMENTS WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN
SPOTTED OWL (1994) [hereinafter FOREST PLAN ROD], discussed in detail infra Part III.A.
See 59 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 20, 1994) (providing notice that the ROD was signed by
the Sec'y of the Interior and Dep. Sec'y of Agriculture); see also Seattle Audubon Soc'y
v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (discussing innovative nature of the Forest
Plan, which strove to resolve years of conflict in the Pacific Northwest, and finding that
it satisfied environmental laws), aff'd, 80 E3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996).
44. See Christopher Georges, Wider Property Owner Compensation May Prove a
Costly Clause in the "Contract with America," WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1994, at A8;
Marianne Lavelle, GOP Marches into New Deregulation Battle, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 19, 1994,
at A16; Mary Beth Regan, The GOP's Guerilla War on Green Laws, Bus. WK., Dec. 12,
1994, at 102.
45., Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt equated the GOP's Contract with America
with an "invisible contract" with lobbyists, who have been allowed to "literally rewrit[e]
our environmental and resource protection laws.' Bruce Babbitt, Springtime for Polluters,
WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1995, at C2; see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as
a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of
Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 733, 734, 761 (1996) ("Many would
conclude that the Marketplace won the election and that environmental law was the
preordained enemy of the Limbaughian majorities that took power. Significantly, industrial
lobbyists straightforwardly took over the legislative process in the 104th Congress').
46. See, e.g., Babbit, supra note 45 (discussing failed efforts to pass legislation
opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas drilling and mining reform);
Gerstenzang, supra note 42 (noting that efforts to enact revisions of the Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994), and the Superfund law, 42 U.S.C §§ 9601-
9675 (1994), were unsuccessful in the 104th Congress); discussion infra Parts III-V
(describing attempts to enact these and other changes piecemeal through appropriations
riders).
47. See discussion infra Parts IV.B-.C.
48. See Rescissions Act, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194, 240-48.
49. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Depart-
ment of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-6, 109 Stat. 73, 86. The 104th Congress did not limit its riders to environmental
issues; it forayed into numerous other public policy areas as well, such as abortion,
immigration, and medical "gag rules?' See discussion infra Parts IV.B-.C.
50. For example, the proposed Appropriations for the Department of Interior and
Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1996, House Bill 1977, 104th Cong.
(1995), contained numerous riders that would increase logging in the Tongass National
Forest, restrict protections for the Mojave National Desert, and curtail or prohibit the
Forest Service and BLM initiative to create a Columbia River Basin Ecosystem Manage-
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III. THE 1995 TIMBER RIDER DEMONSTRATES THE ADVERSE
CONSEQUENCES OF APPROPRIATIONS RIDERS, AND THEIR
DISTORTION OF THE PROCESS OF PUBLIC DEBATE AND INFORMED
DECISIONMAKING
The Rescissions Act of 1995 "making emergency supplemen-
tal appropriations for additional disaster assistance, for . . . the
tragedy that occurred at Oklahoma City" was signed into law by
President Clinton on July 22, 1995.51 An early product of the first
Republican Congress in 40 years, the Rescissions Act was consid-
ered a "down payment" on deficit reduction5 2 and an indication of
the new Congress's fiscal resolve.53
Included in the Rescissions Act was a provision that had nothing
to do with fiscal restraint, but nonetheless demonstrated another
priority of the Republican majority. The so-called Emergency Salvage
Timber Rider, inserted by Rep. Taylor and picked up by Senator
Gorton in the appropriations committees, sought to overturn dec-
ment Strategy. The bill 'was vetoed. See 141 CONG. REC. H15,057 (daily ed., Dec. 18,
1995). Similarly, the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, House Bill 2491, 104th Cong. (1995),
which was also vetoed, see 141 CONG. REC. H14,136-37 (daily ed., Dec. 6, 1995),
included a rider that would open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas
exploration and development. See also discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
51. See Pub. L. 104-19, § 2001, 109 Stat. 194 (1995). In its original form, House
Bill 1158, the Rescissions Act drew the first veto of the Clinton administration, in part
because of the inclusion of this rider, as well as objectionable cuts to education. See 141
CONG. REC. H5315, H5339-52 (daily ed., May 18, 1995). With respect to the timber rider,
the Administration stated that the definition of "salvage" was too broad and opposed the
provision that would overturn the existing land management framework under the North-
west Forest Plan:
The carefully crafted balance in the Forest Plan allows for a sustainable timber
harvest as well as environmental protection. This Plan was key to the release
of a court injunction on logging in the territory of the Northern Spotted Owl
and represents a finely crafted compromise that took two years to achieve. The
Administration believes that it can expedite Option 9 sales without setting
aside the existing land management framework.
Id. at 5341. The Act, including the timber rider, was ultimately passed in slightly revised
form. See Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001, 109 Stat. at 240-47 (1995).
52. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H6594 (daily ed. June 29, 1995) (Statement of Rep.
Dreier).
53. The Act removed $16.4 billion already appropriated for governmental opera-
tions during the current fiscal year. See Dan Morgan & Tom Kenworthy, Pair of Liberals
Block Bill on Spending Cuts, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 1, 1995 at A8.
Traditionally Democratic priorities, such as low-income housing, summer jobs funding,
and federal education programs were particularly targeted by the rescissions process. See,
e.g., David Rogers, Conferees Agree on Spending Cut Bill, Setting Up Confrontation With
Clinton, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1995, at A2.
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ades of environmental policy and compromise relating to logging
in sensitive old growth forests of the Pacific Northwest. In particu-
lar, it attempted to bypass the comprehensive forest management
principles of the Northwest Forest Plan-the recently completed
and much-publicized outcome of negotiations between environmen-
talists and industry, which was strongly supported by President Clin-
ton. Under the guise of expediting "salvage" sales of timber, the
rider mandated timber sales without regard to the Plan, prevented
or reduced the potential for environmental analysis and mitigation,
and narrowly circumscribed the possibility of judicial review.5 4
The effects of the bill have been dramatic, causing the cutting
of millions of board feet of additional timber in areas that had been
declared off-limits, and using methods that but for the rider would
have been prohibited by a variety of environmental statutes. Al-
though many of the provisions of the rider have expired, 5 this will
not undo the damage done by the rider either to the sensitive forest
ecosystems or to the integrity of the political process. Long term
damage has likely been done to sensitive habitat and resident wild-
life by the harvesting allowed and in some cases mandated by the
Act. At the same time, by enacting the timber rider through the
appropriations process, Congressional leaders have denied their
own members the opportunity to make an informed decision about
whether these sales were wise policy or even an efficient use of
the public's natural resources. 56
54. Section 2000 has been characterized as "order[ing] the Forest Service and BLM
to sell off some of the nation's healthiest and most ecologically valuable ancient forests
at bargain basement prices" Michael Axline, Forest Health and the Politics of Expediency,
26 ENvTL. L. 613, 614 (1996).
55. Sections 2001(b) and (d) expired December 31, 1996, but contracts offered prior
to that date continue to be governed by the rider. See § 2001(j). Section 2001(k) expired
on September 30, 1996, see § 2001(a)(2), but harvest of many awarded contracts contin-
ues.
56. "[T]he issue of whether ecologically important federal timber, which supports
a variety of environmental values, should be used to support a jobs program for mills has
never received the congressional attention that such an important and complex issue
deserves." Axline, supra note 54, 54, at 625 (1996). See Muskie, supra note 26, at 172
("MWle should exercise extreme caution concerning every decision which may affect the
environment; we should insure that our public institutions have the capacity to evaluate
environmental hazards and to reduce those hazards to an absolute minimum.").
466 [Vol. 21
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A. The Northwest Forest Plan, Developed through Extensive
Negotiation between Affected Parties, Represents a
Comprehensive Approach to Old Growth Forest Management
Old growth forests,57 part of a complex ecosystem in the Pacific
Northwest, provide habitat to hundreds of wildlife and aquatic spe-
cies, including at least eight threatened or endangered species.,'
They also fulfill important watershed functions by inhibiting ero-
sion and flooding.59 Pacific Northwest old growth is rapidly disap-
pearing-roughly ten percent of the original ancient forest domain
is left in the region.60 This is virtually the only old growth left in
the nation, and almost all of it is located on public lands.
61
Management of public forest lands in the Pacific Northwest
has been marked by controversy since the 1970s, 62 symbolized by
the highly visible and heated debate over the northern spotted
57. Old growth stands are forest stands, typically mature conifers such as Douglas
fir, between 175 and 250 years old, with moderate to high canopy closure, dominated by
large overstory trees and numerous large snags and accumulations of downed wood. See
FOREST ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM: AN ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT IX-24 (1993) [hereinafter FEMAT REPORT]; FOREST PLAN ROD,
supra note 43, at F-4. For a detailed discussion of Pacific Northwest old growth ecosys-
tems, see ELLIOTT A. NORSE, ANCIENT FORESTS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1990).
58. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE NORTHERN
SPOTTED OWL 66-70 (1992); FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at H-3-4, 30-40.
59. They have been held to contribute "some of the highest quality waters flowing
into the major rivers in the American West.' Linda M. Bolduan, The Hatfield Riders:
Eliminating the Role of the Courts in Environmental Decision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 329,
342 (1990). See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSIG THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND,
WATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 156-67 (1992) (discussing ancient forests of the
Pacific Northwest).
60. There are about 2.5 million acres of old growth forests where 19 million acres
once stood. See WILKINSON, supra note 59, at 157. Late successional reserves, which are
forests in mature stages, see FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at IX-18, including old
growth, comprise an additional 7.5 million acres of forest lands. See FOREST PLAN ROD,
supra note 43, at 6.
61. See WILKINSON, supra note 59, at 157. Science knows no way to create
"man-made" old growth forests; nor can it markedly hasten the natural processes that form
them. See id. at 165 (quoting SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS, SCHEDULING THE
HARVEST OF OLD GROWTH 17 (1984)); see also FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at IH-3
(noting that ecologists now believe ecosystems in old forests in the Pacific Northwest may
have developed under climatic conditions that cannot be duplicated).
62. There are numerous articles that detail the history of the controversy and the
litigation that it spawned. See, e.g., Bolduan, supra note 59; Steven L. Yaffee, Lessons
About Leadership from the History of the Spotted Owl Controversy, 35 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 381 (1995); Andrea L. Hungerford, Changing the Management of Public Lands Forests:
The Role of the Spotted Owl Injunctions, 24 ENVTL. L. 1395 (1994); Victor M. Sher,
Travels with Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey through the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND
L. REv. 41 (1993). The history of the litigation over the spotted owl controversy is also
set forth in Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1300 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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owl. 63 Spotted owl populations had been in decline, and forest
health in question, since 1973, when an interagency committee
recommended that the owl be listed under the ESA.6 4 Listing finally
occurred in 1990.65 The dispute over the management of spotted
owl habitat spawned more than a dozen lawsuits, resulting in at
least three separate injunctions against the Bureau of Land Man-
agement ("BLM") and the Forest Service under NFMA, FLPMA,
ESA, and NEPA,66 which severely restricted federal timber sales. 67
In the midst of the spotted owl'controversy, section 318 of the
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act for Fiscal Year 1990, also referred to as the Hatfield/Adams
Rider, became law. 68 Section 318 was intended to balance the desire
for a predictable flow of public timber with the goal of preserving
significant old growth forest stands for the northern spotted owl. 69
Subsection 318(a) set an overall target level of timber from na-
tional forests and BLM lands in Oregon and Washington for fiscal
years 1989 and 1990.70 The statute set forth procedures for expe-
dited review and prohibitions on injunctions and restraining or-
63. The spotted owl, an indicator species, is viewed as "a surrogate for the other
species that inhabit the forest" and a monitor for the overall vitality of forest vegetation
and watersheds. See Bolduan, supra note 59, at 342; 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (providing
guidelines for selection of indicator species and maintenance of their habitat).
64. See Hungerford, supra note 62, at 1404; Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716
F Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
65. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990) (codified at 50 C.FR. § 17 (1993)).
66. For BLM litigation, see Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290(9th Cir. 1992); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Or. 1992), aff'd
sub nom. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993); Portland
Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Or. 1989), aff'd in relevant part, 884 F.2d
1233 (9th Cir. 1989); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 21,210, 21,213
(D. Or. 1988), rev'd and rem'd, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989). For Forest Service cases,
see Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992), aff'd sub
nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc'y
v. Evans, 771 F Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991), aff'd in part, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir.
1991); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, No. C89-160-WD (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6, 1989),
rev'd, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd and rem'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). The litigation
is concisely summarized in Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1299-
1302 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley 80 F.3d 1401
(9th Cir. 1996).
67. See FOREST PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 1.
68. See Dept. of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989); 135 CONG. REc. S8762, 8795-97(daily ed., July 26, 1989). For a discussion of a series of riders that governed timber
harvest in the Northwest, see Bolduan, supra note 59, at 329.
69. See Gifford Pinchot Alliance v. Butruille, 742 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 (D. Or.
1990).
70. § 318(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 745.
Appropriations Riders
ders, 71 and required certain minimal environmental safeguards in
lieu of existing laws.72 These procedures applied exclusively to
timber sales from the "thirteen national forests in Oregon and
Washington and [BLM] Management districts in western Oregon
known to contain northern spotted owls." 73
Despite Congress's attempt to reduce governmental interfer-
ence and encourage timber production, some section 318 sales
were delayed or suspended by litigation. Section 318 itself was
challenged on constitutional grounds, with the Supreme Court ul-
timately affirming the law in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soci-
ety.74 A number of section 318 sales were enjoined while this issue
moved through the courts. 75 Other sales were challenged over their
compliance with the specific terms of section 318, such as the
requirement to minimize fragmentation of ecologically significant
old growth.76 Many such sales did not go forward because of con-
cerns about impacts to listed species, particularly the marbled mur-
relet 77 and spotted owl.78
In April 1993, in response to judicial decisions that halted
logging in essentially all federal old growth forests within the
range of the spotted owl, the Clinton Administration convened the
Forest Conference in Portland, Oregon. As a result of the confer-
ence, the interdisciplinary Forest Ecosystem Management Assess-
ment Team ("FEMAT") was assembled to produce a scientific op-
tions report.79 The FEMAT report was then analyzed, along with
71. See § 318(d),(f)(1),(g), 103 Stat. at 748-50.
72. Although section 318 directed the agencies to sell ecologically significant old
growth only as necessary and in a manner designed to minimize the effects of fragmen-
tation within each sale, see § 318(b)(1),(2), and provided that nothing was to affect
interagency cooperation under the ESA and its regulations, see § 318(e), it was a
"piecemeal approach to forest resource use when a broad, long-term vision is needed."
Bolduan, supra note 59, at 375.
73. See § 318(i), 103 Stat. at 750.
74. 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
75. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Or. 1992).
76. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, No. C89-160-WD, (W.D. Wash. Nov.
6, 1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd and rem'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
77. On September 28, 1992, the FWS listed the marbled murrelet, a seabird that is
also dependent on old growth forest stands, as a threatened species. See 57 Fed. Reg.
45,328 (1992).
78. See Lone Rock Timber Co. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 842 F. Supp. 433
(D. Or. 1994). See generally Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir.
1996).
79. See FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57.
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its suggested alternatives for forest management, in the Supple-
mental Environmental Impact Statement ("SEIS") for the North-
west Forest Plan.80
The Record of Decision ("ROD") for Amendments to Forest
Service and BLM Planning Documents Within the Range of the
Northern Spotted Owl (the Northwest Forest Plan) was issued in
April 1994,81 in "an attempt to anticipate and forestall future envi-
ronmental problems, avoiding the severe economic dislocation and
legal gridlock that occur when environmental problems are ig-
nored. 82 The agencies characterized the Northwest Forest Plan as
an "unprecedented effort in public land management."83 The Plan
represents a comprehensive ecosystem approach, analyzing the in-
terrelatedness of all resources-timber, fish and wildlife, water
quality-as well as economic well-being over a vast planning area.
It is the first time that the BLM and the Forest Service, two of the
largest federal land management agencies, have worked together to
develop a common management approach for public lands through-
out an entire ecosystem.8 4 It was also strongly supported by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.85
The ROD consists of extensive standards, guidelines, and land
allocations that comprise a comprehensive ecosystem management
strategy, designed to end the decades-long spotted owl controversy by
accommodating both the need for sustained timber yield and pro-
tection of forest resources. 6 It establishes two primary categories
of land allocation: reserves, including late-successional reserves 7
80. See FOREST PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 1. The draft SEIS was made available
on July 28, 1993, see 58 Fed. Reg. 40,444-45 (1993), and generated over 100,000 public
comments. See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE ET AL., FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT app. 4 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL SEIS]; see also FOREST
PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 25-28, 65-73. The final SEIS was released in February
1994. See 59 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (1994). It considered 10 alternatives in detail, selected from
48 strategies analyzed in the FEMAT report. See Moseley, 80 F.3d at 1404.
81. See 59 Fed. Reg. 18,788.
82. FOREST PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 1-2. It is intended to "provide for a steady
supply of timber sales and nontimber resources that can be sustained over the long-term
without degrading the health of the forest or other environmental resources." Id. at 3-4.
83. Id. at 1; see also Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1303.
84. See FOREST PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 1.
85. See FINAL SEIS, supra note 80, at app. G.
86. See id. at 3-4; Moseley, 80 F.3d at 1404 (the alternative selected, Option 9,
protects Wildlife viability while allowing other multiple use activities).
87. Late successional reserves are forests in mature stages, including old growth.
See FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at IX-18. A mature stand is defined as one "for which
the annual net rate of growth has peaked," and includes those generally between 100 and
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and riparian reserves,88 where programmed harvest is severely re-
stricted;8 9 and "matrix" and "adaptive management" areas, where
harvest may proceed in accordance with the Plan's requirements.90
Immediately after the ROD was issued, environmental groups
and industry groups brought a series of actions challenging the
legality of the Northwest Forest Plan. Environmentalists challenged,
inter alia, the Plan's compliance with NEPA and with NFMA
wildlife "viability" regulations, alleging that the ROD did not en-
sure that a viable population of old growth forest dependent spe-
cies, including the northern spotted owl, would be maintained.9'
Industry groups alleged that the Plan was too restrictive, in viola-
tion of NFMA, FLPMA, NEPA, and other laws.9
2
In December 1994, Judge Dwyer, of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Washington, rejected all challenges, and declared
the Plan to be lawful under NEPA, NFMA and their implementing
regulations. 93 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that the litigation
had presented a "substantial controversy ... surrounding a plan
designed to bring some much needed coherence to the management
of federal forests in the Pacific Northwest."
94
180 years old. See id. at IX-20. Old growth, by comparison, is usually 175-250 years old,
with larger diameter and greater structural complexity. See id. at IX-20, IX-24.
88. A riparian area includes "the aquatic ecosystem and adjacent upland areas that
directly affect it," including floodplain, woodlands, and areas within approximately 100
feet of the high-water mark of a stream or the shoreline of a standing water body. See
FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at IX-30.
89. Certain salvage and thinning activities are allowed. See FOREST PLAN ROD,
supra note 43, at 2.
90. See id. at 2, 6-11. Programmed harvest may occur on approximately 22% of
the 24 million acres of federal land in the planning area. See id. Harvest levels under the
Plan are expected to be about one-fourth of pre-litigation 1980s levels. See Hungerford,
supra note 62, at 1430 (citing Draft SEIS at S-16).
91. See Supplemental Complaint at 1-3, Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F.
Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (Civil No. 92-479D), aff'd sub nom. Seattle Audubon
Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996).
92. See Northwest Forest Resources Council (NFRC) v. Dombeck, No. 94-1031-TPJ
(D.D.C.) (complaint filed May 11, 1994); Northwest Forest Resources Council v. Thomas,
No. 94-1032-TPJ (D.D.C.) (complaint filed May 11, 1994); Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1300.
93. 871 F. Supp. at 1300. The three-year logging ban had been lifted earlier that
year. See Hungerford, supra note 62, at 1431.
94. Moseley, 80 F.3d at 1406.
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B. The 1995 Timber Rider's Provisions Required or Encouraged
Sales that May Proceed Regardless of Violations of the Forest
Plan or Environmental Law
1. Subsection (k) of the Timber Rider Required the Release of
Previously Cancelled or Enjoined Sales
Subsection 2001(k) of the Rescissions Act directs the Secre-
taries of the Interior and Agriculture to, inter alia:
act to award, release, and permit to be completed in fiscal years
1995 and 1996, with no change in originally advertised terms,
volumes, and bid prices, all timber sale contracts offered or
awarded before that date in any unit of the National Forest
System or district of the Bureau of Land Management subject
to section 318 of Public Law 101-121 (103 Stat. 745).95
At the time the bill was signed into law, it was widely believed
that subsection 2001(k) applied to a discrete set of remaining
section 318 sales. 96 However, immediately after the rider was en-
acted, timber industry representatives sought to compel the release
of all timber sales offered prior to the rider's enactment on all
public lands within the geographic scope of section 318. 91
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
agreed with the timber industry's expansive interpretation, and or-
dered the BLM to release all pending timber sales in western
Oregon and the Forest Service to release all pending timber sales
on any national forest within the states of Washington and Ore-
gon. 98 The' court's order was affirmed by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on April 24, 1996.99 These rulings
required the release of sixty-two additional sales, totalling 230 mil-
95. Pub. L. 104-19, § 2001(k)(1), 109 Stat. 194 (1995).
96. See U.S. FOREST SERVICE, EFFECTS STATEMENT, Ex. D to United States'
Memorandum in Opposition to Temporary Restraining Order, NFRC v. Glickman (NFRC
I), 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-6244-MRH). As discussed supra Part III.A.2,
section 318 applied exclusively to sales offered in fiscal years 1989 and 1990 in the 13
national forests in Oregon and Washington and BLM districts in western Oregon known
to contain northern spotted owls. See Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(i), 103 Stat. 701, 750
(1989).
97. See NFRC v. Glickman, No. CV-95-06244-MRH (complaint filed Aug. 8, 1995).
98. See NFRC v. Glickman, No. 95-6244 (D. Or. Sept. 13, 1995).
99. See NFRC , 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996).
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lion board feet (MMBF) over and above the remaining section 318
sales volume. 00
The district court entered a second order in the case, which
held, inter alia, that section 2001(k) required the release of all
sales in Oregon and Washington'01 if the bids were opened during
the relevant time period.l02 The Ninth Circuit also affirmed that
decision. 10 3 Thus, subsection (k) required the release of all sales
that had been offered any time in the last five years anywhere on
public lands in the states of Washington and Oregon-even if the
sales had been withheld or enjoined for failure to comply with the
Northwest Forest Plan or any environmental law or regulation. 0 4
2. The Rider Provided Agencies with Virtually Non-Reviewable
Discretion to Execute Timber Sales
By combining a broad grant of authority with explicit restric-
tions on judicial review, the timber rider made it virtually impos-
sible to successfully challenge salvage sale awards. Section 2001(b)
provided that salvage sales shall be offered "to the maximum ex-
tent feasible .. above the programmed level" of harvest, notwith-
standing any other law or previously entered judicial order.105 "Sal-
vage timber sale" was defined very broadly: a sale "for which an
important reason for entry includes the removal of ... dead, dam-
aged, or down trees."' 0 6 The statute provided expedited procedures
for these salvage sales: the Secretary could rely on pre-existing
100. See United States' Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion for Stay
Pending Appeal, at 5-6, 19-20 (filed Oct. 19, 1995) (No. 95-36038). Replacement timber
was offered for some sales under a narrow exception provided in section 2001(k)(2),
allowing harvesting to be done in less environmentally sensitive areas, see NFRC v.
Glickman (NFRC II), 97 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 1996); Tom Kenworthy, U.S., Timber
Firms Agree to Save Old-Growth Tracts, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1996, at A3.
101. See NFRC v. Glickman, No. 95-6255-MJH, slip op. at 16 (D. Or. Jan. 10,
1996).
102. The court held that Pacific Northwest timber sales offered between October
23, 1989, the date of section 318's enactment, and July 27, 1995, the date of enactment
of the 1995 timber rider, must be released. See id. at 13.
103. See NFRC II, 97 F.3d at 1165-66. The Ninth Circuit subsequently denied the
environmental groups' motion for clarification of this issue, rejecting their argument that
sales that had been found to violate applicable laws (other than section 318 itself) at the
time they were offered were void ab initio. See NFRC v. Glickman, No. 96-35132 (9th
Cir. July 23, 1996).
104. See id.
105. See Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001(b)(1), 109 Stat. 194, 241 (1995).
106. § 2001(a)(3).
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documents, no matter how dated they were, or prepare a document
that combined "an environmental assessment . . . [under NEPA]
and a biological evaluation" under the ESA. l0 7
In addition, section 2001(f) severely restricted the scope and
timing of judicial review of salvage sale decisions. 108 The scope of
review was limited to a determination of whether the decision was
"arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with ap-
plicable law (other than laws specified in subsection (i))."'10 9 This
limitation essentially exempted salvage sales from the requirements
of all major federal environmental and natural resources laws." 0
Section 2001(f) further discouraged challenges by permitting suits
to be brought only within 15 days of a sale's initial advertise-
ment.11'
Subsection (d) of the Act directed the Secretary to "expedi-
tiously prepare, offer, and award timber sale contracts" on forests
covered by the Northwest Forest Plan notwithstanding any other
law or pre-enactment judicial order. 1 2 Like section 2001(b), sub-
section (d) specifically prohibited judicial review based on environ-
mental laws, including NFMA, NEPA and the ESA. 1"3 The Ninth
Circuit found that the requirement that sales proceed "notwith-
standing any other law," and the limitation on judicial review, left
it with essentially no law to apply to challenges based on environ-
mental concerns." 4
107. § 2001(c)(1)(A) (citing NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1995); ESA § 7(a)(2), 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1985)).
108. See § 2001(f)(4)-(5).
109. § 2001(f)(4) (emphasis added).
110. It provides that, with respect to any activity related to a salvage timber sale:
"The documents and procedures : . . shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of the
following applicable Federal laws (and regulations implementing such laws): ... [NEPA,
the ESA, NFMA], [and] . . . [a]ll other applicable Federal environmental and natural
resource laws:' § 2001(i). President Clinton has directed the agencies to comply with
environmental laws "to the maximum extent allowed" and to conduct sales in an "envi-
ronmentally sound manner," and the agencies have issued agreements and directives to
minimize impacts to natural resources, in which they have evidenced their intention to
continue to comply with environmental laws "to the extent practicable." However, these
guidance documents have not been construed as legally enforceable. See, e.g., Inland
Empire v. Glickman, 911 F. Supp. 431, 437 (D. Mont. 1995), aff'd, 88 F.3d 697 (9th Cir.
1996).
111. See § 2001(f)(5).
112. See § 2001(d).
113. See id.
114. See Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir.
1996) (rejecting allegations that sales would degrade aquatic resources, reduce viable
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In fact, all courts that have reviewed challenges to section
2001(b) and (d) sales have upheld the decision to proceed with the
sale. 115 The clear implication is that agency conclusions regarding
endangered species, watershed, sustained yield, and cost-benefit
analyses clearly are off-limits to citizen challenges.11 6 Even com-
pelling evidence that salvage sales will have adverse effects on
endangered or threatened species will not be a basis for invalidat-
ing a salvage sale.117
In sum, although subsection (d), like subsection (b), is not as
draconian as section 2001(k), in that it provides the Administration
with discretion to proceed with Northwest Forest Plan sales, no
analytical documents or protective procedures are required under
section 2001(d), and virtually no judicial review is allowed if a
challenge is presented on environmental grounds. While the agen-
cies can take steps to prevent adverse environmental effects with
respect to subsection (b) and (d) sales, the rider allows them to
populations of resident and anadromous fish species, and violate Northwest Forest Plan
standards and guidelines as unreviewable).
115. A number of these opinions have upheld section 2001(b) sales. See, e.g., Idaho
Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996); Southwest Center for
Biological Diversity v. Glickman, 932 F.Supp. 1189 (D. Ariz., 1996); Ozark Chapter/Sierra
Club v. Thomas, 924 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Idaho Conservation League v.
Thomas, 917 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Idaho, 1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1996); Inland
Empire Public Lands Council v. Glickman, 911 F. Supp. 431 (D. Mont. 1995), aff'd, 88
F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 1996); Kentucky Heartwood v. U.S. Forest Service, 906 F. Supp. 410
(E.D. Ky. 1995); see also Armuchee Alliance v. King, 922 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(rejecting constitutional challenges based on separation of powers, vagueness, equal
protection and due process). Other recent cases have upheld decisions to proceed with
section 2001(d) sales regardless of alleged failure to comply with NEPA, NFMA, and the
Northwest Forest Plan. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d
792 (9th Cir. 1996); Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 94-6245-TC (D. Or. 1995),
aff'd, 93 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 1996).
116. See Idaho Sporting Congress, 92 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996); Idaho Conservation
League, 91 F.3d 1345; Inland Empire, 88 F.3d 697.
117. See Idaho Conservation League, 91 F.3d 1345 (allowing salvage harvesting in
highly eroded drainage, even though FWS and NMFS determined that sales were likely
to adversely affect salmon and trout); cf. Inland Empire, 88 F.3d 697 (upholding district
court's determination that sale could go forward under section 2001(b) even if adverse
effects to endangered grizzly bear had been shown); Kentucky Heartwood, 906 F. Supp.
410 (rejecting challenge to sale that would allegedly affect the Indiana bat; court found
that record supported Forest Service's position that sale would not harm the bat, but stated
that there was little it could do even if adverse effects were proven). For a list of the most
controversial salvage sales, see Elizabeth Manning, Forests Worth Fighting For, HIGH
COUNTRY NEws, Sept. 2, 1996, at 12. For a discussion of public protests over salvage
logging under the rider, see Tony Davis, Last Line of Defense: Civil Disobedience and
Protest Slow Down "Lawless Logging", HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Sept. 2, 1996, at 6, 10-11.
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proceed with damaging sales in the Northwest Forest Plan area and
other forests, without any public input or opportunity for review.
C. The Abbreviated Appropriations Process Allowed the Rider
to be Enacted without Sufficient Legislative Consideration of its
Scope and Consequences
Despite the dramatic effects of the timber rider on forest man-
agement policy, its passage was accompanied by severely limited
debate. The rider was not submitted to the congressional commit-
tees having jurisdiction over federal lands for hearings or for the
preparation of reports.1"' Not only were no reports made available
on the language of the bill at the time of its consideration; mem-
bers of the House had to vote on the bill without seeing the final
language themselves.t 19
As a result, many members were surprised to discover the
actual impact of the rider. In addition, benefits of the rider touted
by sponsors have proved to be overstated, and its potential for harm
substantially greater than was acknowledged when the bill was
voted on. The rider's passage clearly demonstrates the dangers of
legislating on policy through the appropriations process.
118. See Axline, supra note 54, at 631-32 (citing 141 CONG. REc. H6637 (daily
ed., June 29, 1995)).
119. See 141 CONG. REc. H6637 (daily ed. June 29, 1995). Many members
criticized the techniques of the bill's sponsors during floor debate. See id. (statement of
Rep. Obey) ("The timber issue is important to a lot of people in this House, including me,
and just for the heck of it, I would like to know what the agreement is and see it in black
and white before we debate it. It might be kind of quaint, but it might also be kind of
useful."); id. at H6638 (statement of Rep. Defazio) ("[W]e are being asked to accept a pig
in a poke. We are being told that the Democrat Administration has entered into a secret
agreement not available in writing with the Republican majority which we are going to
be asked to vote on within 15 minutes here in the House of Representatives .... This is
an outrage, this is an extraordinary outrage."); id.; at H6639 (statement of Rep. Furse) ("It
is impossible for us to know whether this is going to be good for our watershed plans or
bad for them, because we do not know the language.") (other citations and footnotes
omitted). For a contradictory viewpoint, see Slade Gorton & Julie Hayes, Legislative
History of the Timber and Salvage Amendments Enacted in the 104th Congress: A Small
Victory for Timber Communities in the Pacific Northwest, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 641 (Envtl.
Law Inst.) (1996) (noting that the language and some analysis of House Bill 1158, the
rider's defeated predecessor, were available at the time of passage).
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1. The Scope and Impact of the Bill, Unexamined during
Passage, Have Proved Far Greater than Sponsors Claimed
In the absence of committee hearings or extended analysis, the
rider's sponsors were largely able to shape the debate that took
place in the House. The sponsors focused attention on the provi-
sions that appeared most compelling, such as the one expediting
salvage sales, section 2001(b).120 Senator Gorton created a sense of
urgency by arguing that "the window of opportunity that the agen-
cies have to conduct these forest health and salvaging operations
gets smaller with each passing day . . . set[ting] the stage for
another devastating wildfire season this summer."1 21 Representative
Taylor further stated that "[w]e are not talking about green timber
that needs also to be harvested. We are talking about dead and
dying trees. We are talking about timber that has been burned. 12 2
In addition, the bill's sponsors minimized the breadth of the
rider by explaining section 2001(k) as a provision that simply
allowed the administration to proceed with sales that had been
previously authorized, but had been subject to lengthy delays. 123
Yet, far from allowing the Clinton Administration to proceed with
sales that it believed to be desirable, section 2001(k) forced the
agencies to proceed with a number of sales that they had deter-
mined to be in violation of the Northwest Forest Plan standards
120. The legislative history deals extensively with the subject of forest health-fire,
disease, and insect infestation-but barely mentions section 318 or green tree sales. See
141 CONG. REc. H5557 (daily ed. May 24, 1995) (Rep. Taylor's defense of the bill's
predecessor); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-71, at 20-23 (1995); S. REP. No. 104-17, at
122-24 (1995); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-124 (1995).
121. Letter from Senator Slade Gorton to Members of the Interior Subcommittee of
the Senate Appropriations Committee (Mar. 20, 1995) (cited in Axline, supra note 54, at
626 n.79).
122. 141 CONG. REc. H3153 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1995); see also id. at H5558-59
(daily ed. May 24, 1995) (Rep. Metcalf predicted that, without the rider, valuable natural
resources will "rot" away: "Sadly, if these giants are not harvested within 2 years of being
blown down, or fire or disease-damaged, they are of no value as timber.. .. This is part
of the emergency situation we face in our forests.").
123. See H.R. REP. No. 104-124, at 137; 141 CONG. REc. S4875 (daily ed. Mar.
30, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton); id. at S10,463-65 (daily ed. July 21, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Gorton). Senator Gorton retracted this representation as soon as the
rider was enacted and wrote a letter to the Clinton Administration stating that he expected
the agencies to release all old sales in all forests and districts in Washington and Oregon.
See NFRC v. Glickman (NFRC I), 82 F.3d 825, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing July 27,
1995 letter of Sens. Gorton, Murkowski, and four others). See generally Gorton & Hayes,
supra note 119.
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and guidelines, and that they believed would likely cause serious,
irreparable harm. 2 4
The difference in scope between that suggested when the
bill was debated and that actually required by the law was
substantial. The bill's sponsors told their colleagues that section
2001(k) would release roughly 300 MMBF of section 318 sales. 25
It later became clear that members, including those familiar with
logging practices in the Pacific Northwest, were confused about the
amount of timber the rider would actually release. 2 6 In fact, it
required the Forest Service to release approximately 116 MMBF
more timber than anticipated, and the BLM to release nearly 115
MMBF more than expected, from areas that were never governed
by section 318.127
2. The Timber Rider May Substantially Diminish Agencies'
Ability to Accomplish Multiple Use and Sustained Yield
Objectives
Although the rider purported to be short-term legislation to
remedy an "emergency" situation, its provisions, especially section
2001(k), undermine years of planning and multiple use resource
management in the northwest forests, with potentially long-term
124. See U.S. Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal at 19-27 (filed Oct. 19, 1995) NFRC v. Glickman (NFRC I), 82 F.3d 825 (No.
95-36038) (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter U.S. Memorandum]. The sponsors told Congress
that the rider would effectuate implementation of the Northwest Forest Plan, when in fact
section 2001(k) "undermined that plan by requiring the cutting of old growth reserves
which the Forest Plan was crafted to protect." Furse Takes Lead in Repealing Tinber
Salvage Rider, Press Release (Dec. 7, 1995) (cited in Axline, supra note 54, at n.121)
[hereinafter Furse Press Release].
125. See 141 CONG. REc. S10,464 (daily ed. July 21, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Gorton).
126. See 142 CONG. REC. H6635, H6661 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (Oregon Rep.
Wes Cooley remarked that "750 million board feet" would be released under section
2001(k).
127. See U.S. Memorandum, supra note 124, at 5-6, 19-20. The total amount
required to be released, including section 318 and non-318 sales, was well over 400
MMBF. See id. at 5-6, 19-20. Senator Gorton, however, in a post-enactment article,
estimated that 650 MMBF would be released-more than twice as much as he told his
colleagues would be required. See Gorton & Hayes, supra note 119, at 644. Senator Gorton
believes that this is a sustainable amount of harvest. See id. at 646. Gorton neglects the
fact that timber stands are not fungible, and that much of the section 2001(k) harvest is
taking place in the most sensitive areas in Pacific Northwest forests-areas that had been
reserved from timber cutting under the Northwest Forest Plan, see U.S. Memorandum,
supra note 124, at 19-20, although a small number of replacement sales have been
accomplished under the rider. See Kenworthy, supra note 100.
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effects. 128 In the wake of the harvests and habitat disruptions per-
mitted by the rider, resource management choices in the affected
forests are likely to remain severely limited even after the conclu-
sion of the emergency period.129 In addition, by upsetting the Plan's
careful balancing of interests, the rider discredited the political
process and "reopened old wounds in communities which were
beginning to heal [after] decades of 'timber wars.""' 30
Declarations submitted by the United States in a motion to
stay implementation of the rider, after it was expansively inter-
preted by Judge Hogan, indicated that a number of the sales re-
quired to be released under section 2001(k) had been withdrawn
long before the rider's enactment, because they did not comply
with Northwest Forest Plan standards and guidelines.' 31 In addition,
section 2001(k) resurrected sales that had been enjoined for viola-
tions of NEPA and other environmental laws. 32 Many old sales had
been withdrawn or enjoined because they would harm forest re-
sources, such as watersheds, 33 or endangered, threatened and at-
risk species, such as the chinook salmon, 34 northern spotted owl,
128. See Furse Press Release, supra note 124; 142 CONG. Rc. H6635, H6656
(daily ed., June 20, 1996) (statement of Rep. Porter) (the rider "is superseding the carefully
crafted environmental and natural resource laws that previously regulated logging in the
Pacific Northwest").
129. See discussion, infra, at notes 139-143 and accompanying text.
130. See 141 CONG. Rc. S4870 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1995) (Sen. Murray predicted
political turmoil in the Northwest); 142 CONG. REC. H6635, H6655 (daily ed. June 20,
1996) (Rep. Furse stated that "[b]y circumventing the normal avenues of public input:'
section 2001 "has reignited a war in the woods"); Tom Kenworthy, Protected Timber
Opened to Logging, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1995, at A13 (the rider, and the interpretation
given it by the courts, strikes a blow to the "comprehensive plan for managing forests in
the Northwest . . [which] put[ ] to rest years of public battle over old-growth timber in
the region"); Tom Kenworthy, A Clear-Cut Solution for Loggers, WASH. POST, Feb. 19,
1996 at Al (the rider "ignited a new logging war between timber companies and
environmentalists throughout the West" by requiring the agencies to proceed with sales
that were halted years ago to protect wildlife and fish, and "short-circuit[ing] the normally
complex regulatory and legal structure that applies to timber sales on federal land").
131. See Declaration of William Bradley at 4-5, attached to U.S. Memorandum,
supra note 124 [hereinafter Bradley Declaration].
132. See ONRC's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 8-9
(filed Oct. 19, 1995), NRFC v. Glickman (NFRC I), 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (No.
95-36038) (discussing the Tiptop and Tip sales in the Wenatchee forest, enjoined on NEPA
and NFMA grounds in Leavenworth Audubon v. Ferraro, 881 F Supp. 1482 (W.D. Wash.
1995), and the Gatorson sale in the Colville National Forest, enjoined on NEPA grounds in
Smith v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 93-178-JLG (E.D. Wash. Mar. 30, 1995)). See generally
Declaration of Robert Williams, Associate Regional Forester for the Pacific Northwest
Region, attached to U.S. Memorandum, supra note 124 [hereinafter Williams Declaration].
133. See Kenworthy, supra note 130, at A5.
134. See Williams Declaration, supra note 132, at 6-11; see also Declaration of
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and shortnose sucker.135 Agency officials predicted that the release
of many 2001(k) sales would result in severe long-term effects:
[T]he harvest of most of these 62 sales would adversely impact
northern spotted owls, marbled murrelets, shortnose suckers,
and bull trout. In some cases, these impacts would be serious
and may lead to direct mortality .... In most of these cases,
adverse impacts to habitat would be long-term and would lead
to depressed reproduction rates and reduced probabilities of
recovery for these species.13 6
The resulting damage is not likely to be undone quickly now
that the rider has expired. Because section 2001(k) sales were
awarded on originally offered terms, they did not comply with the
Northwest Forest Plan's strategies for protecting fragile soils, old
growth, watersheds, and wildlife. 37 The extensive logging required
by section 2001(k), some of which took place in late successional
reserves, could well cause such declines in populations of at-risk
species that the return of Northwest Forest Plan standards and
guidelines will do little good.'38 Similarly, harvest in riparian areas
could degrade aquatic habitat to the point that applying the Forest
Plan's Aquatic Conservation Strategy to future activities will not
necessarily reverse those effects. 139
Dr. Jacqueline Wyland, Chief, Environmental and Technical Services Division, National
Marine Fisheries Service, at % 13, 38-39, 45-46, 49-50, 53-54, 58, and Attachment A,
attached to U.S. Memorandum, supra note 124 [hereinafter Wyland Declaration] (listing
BLM and Forest Service 2001(k) sales that will affect threatened or at-risk anadromous
fish species, including Snake River chinook salmon, cutthroat trout, coho salmon, and
steelhead trout).
135. See Bradley Declaration, supra note 131, at 4; Declaration of Thomas J.
Dwyer, %% 9-12, 15-16, 19-21, 26, and App. I, attached to U.S. Memorandum, supra note
124 [hereinafter Dwyer Declaration].
136. See Dwyer Declaration, supra note 135, at 26 (emphasis added); see also
Second Declaration of Spear, at 22, attached to U.S. Memorandum in Opposition to
TRO, supra note 96 (predicting that the Forest Service's 2001(k) sales will cause long-term
impacts to habitat and reduce the probability of recovery of northern spotted owls,
murrelets, shortnose suckers, and bull trout).
137. See Kenworthy, supra note 130, at Al ("Everything we've learned about how
not to log in the West has been thrown out the window. This is the old style, ugly clear-cuts
the Forest Service said they'd never do again:') (quoting former congressman Jim Jontz
(D-Ind.), who now heads Western Ancient Forest Campaign).
138. "It is now painfully clear that in short-circuiting the process and exempting
timber sales from the environmental laws ... irreparable harm to the fragile ecosystems
was caused to our national forests:' 142 CoNG. REc. H6635, H6657 (daily ed., June 20,
1996) (statement of Rep. Yates).
139. The FEMAT report identified 314 at-risk anadromous salmonid stocks iden-
tified within the range of the northern spotted owl and concluded that habitat protections
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As a result of such lasting impacts, forest management deci-
sions in the future are likely to be more restrictive than might
otherwise have been the case. For example, because numerous
section 2001 timber sales have been exempted from the require-
ments of the Endangered Species Act, consultations on post-rider
activities may well result in "jeopardy findings"1 40 under that act,
in light of the cumulative effects of timber sales on the forest
landscape.' 41 Such a finding could preclude future grazing, mining,
or agriculture that otherwise would have been permissible.142 These
long-term effects on the Pacific Northwest communities and forest
resources could have been avoided, or at least mitigated, had the
rider been considered in the "full sunshine of public review" 143
instead of being sheltered by appropriations subterfuge.
on federal lands are "increasingly important for ensuring the existence of high quality
aquatic resources:' FEMAT REPORT, supra note 57, at V-2. Accordingly, the Northwest
Forest Plan incorporated an Aquatic Conservation Strategy to avoid further damage to
riparian habitat. See FOREST PLAN ROD, supra note 43, at 9-10. Protective measures
imposed on new sales in riparian areas-but not 2001(k) sales-include buffer zones
around streams, helicopter retrieval of logs in areas with fragile soils and less disruptive
road construction techniques. For other management measures that protect riparian areas
in forests with anadromous fish-bearing streams, see Interim Strategy for Managing
Anadromous Fish-Producing Watersheds ("PACFISH"), 60 Fed. Reg. 11,655 (1995) (amend-
ing forest plans and BLM resource management plans for public lands in eastern Oregon
and Washington, Idaho, and northern California). For interim management measures
protective of National Forest System riparian areas with resident fish species, see Inland
Native Fish Strategy, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,758 (1995). These-two interim strategies are to be
replaced with long-term ecosystem plans with the adoption of the Columbia River Basin
Ecosystem Management Strategy, see 59 Fed. Reg. 4680 (1994), which is to be completed
in the summer of 1998. See 62 Fed. Reg. 2176 (1997).
140. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
141. See Wyland Declaration, supra note 134, at 23, 35-36 (impacts of additional
sales would degrade watersheds more than anticipated in consultations that had taken place
on over one hundred grazing, mining, and harvest activities in the Wallowa-Whitman and
Umatilla National Forests); Dwyer Declaration, supra note 135, at 20 (noting degrada-
tion due to historic watershed impacts from activities including timber harvest, grazing,
and agriculture in the sale area, and potential exacerbation due to further timber harvest).
142. Activities taken pursuant to the rider's salvage logging provision, § 2001(b),
may also hinder the achievement of forest plan goals and objectives-complicating
programmatic planning efforts and perhaps even foreclosing some future management
activities. See WILDERNESS SOC'Y, SALVAGE LOGGING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS: AN
ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND LEGAL ASSESSMENT 9-10 (1996).
143. Gorton & Hayes, supra note 119, at 647 (arguing that the rider was not enacted
behind closed doors).
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3. The Rider's Benefits, as Claimed by Sponsors, Were Not
Evaluated and Have Not Materialized
Congress enumerated several reasons for enacting the timber
rider, most notably improvement of forest health and recovery of
the economic value of damaged timber before extensive deteriora-
tion occurs. 144 However, whether salvage harvesting actually does
promote forest health by controlling future fire and insect infesta-
tion is debatable. 145 Whether measures as drastic as a blanket ex-
emption from all environmental laws was necessary to address this
concern is even more questionable, given the agencies' extensive
discretion and authority under the National Forest Management Act
and Federal Land Policy and Management Act to manage forest
lands. 146
Further, at the time of the rider's enactment, the legislative
bodies and the President were led to believe that it would generate
funds to provide disaster relief for bombing victims and anti-ter-
rorism measures.1 47 However, the two provisions with the greatest
potential to contribute to losses to the federal treasury were barely
mentioned during committee and floor debate. First, the rider al-
lowed salvage sales to proceed, even if they resulted in "below cost
sales" for which the government's costs of preparation exceeded
revenues. 141 In addition, section 2001(k) required the award and
release of old sales, which were offered more than five years ago
144. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-124, at 134 (1995).
145. See Axline, supra note 54, at 626-28; see also Tom Kenworthy, Wildfires
Rekindle Debate on What's Best for Forests, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1996, at Al, All (many
forestry experts attribute the explosion of wildfires during the summer of 1996 to
"well-intended but misguided fire suppression efforts and poor timber harvest practices";
according to NRDC spokesperson Sami Yassa, the increase in wildfires shows "how
disingenuous [Congress's] concerns about fire really are": harvest practices have increased
fire severity by removing the largest, most fire-resistant trees).
146. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14 (1994); 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (1994). See generally
WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 14, Ch. IV (discussing Forest Service's broad
discretion under the National Forest Management Act and Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield
Act to establish natural resources priorities and protect forest health and sustainability).
147. See 141 CONG. REc. H5557, H5561-62 (daily ed. May 24, 1995) (statement
of Rep. Riggs); Gorton & Hayes, supra note 119, at 647 (based on the sponsors'
pre-enactment representations of the timber harvest required by the rider, the Congres-
sional Budget Office reported that the rider would generate $84 million in revenue).
148. See Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001(c)(6), 109 Stat. 194, 241 (1995). "Below cost
sales" are not forbidden by the National Forest Management Act, although economic
suitability is a factor to be considered. See 16 U.S.C. § 6(k) (1994). Increased salvage
logging frequently results in additional losses from below cost sale. See WILDERNESS
Soc'y, supra note 142, at 30.
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when prices were generally lower, on "originally advertised terms,
volumes, and bid prices. ' 149 It is now estimated that, even with the
sale of valuable old growth timber, the rider could cost taxpayers
in excess of $330 million.15 0
Moreover, although the rider purported to create jobs and pro-
vide assistance to communities dependent on federal timber, any
economic benefit attributable to the rider has accrued to only a few
mills, and the brief increase in available federal timber will not
halt the overall decline of the timber industry's economic impor-
tance in the Pacific Northwest.'-" In fact, the opposite may be
true-the rider may accelerate the industry's demise by depleting
available resources more quickly and obstructing the renewal of
areas available for selective harvest in a manner ensuring sustain-
able yields.15 2
149. Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001(k)(1).
150. See Axline, supra note 54, at 617 & n.27 (citing WILDERNESS Soc'Y, ESTI-
MATED FISCAL COSTS OF CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR EMERGENCY SALVAGE TIMBER SALE
PROGRAM 1 (1995)). The Congressional Research Service Estimated that the salvage
program alone could cost the Treasury as much as $233.5 million. See WILDERNESS SOC'Y,
supra note 142, at 32-33. Representative Lowey reported to her colleagues that the
Congressional Research Service had estimated that the rider would cost $50 million in
1996 alone. See 142 CONG. REC. H6635, H6661-62 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (it is unclear
whether this amount reflects the costs of all three provisions of the rider, including green
tree sales awarded under section 2001(k), or whether it is limited to salvage sales under
section 2001(b), which are typically less lucrative); see also id. at H6660-61 (Rep. Morella
predicted that section 2001 sales in fragile and remote roadless areas are likely to be big
money-losers, "[w]hile a potential boondoggle for large timber companies, PL 104-19
poses a significant threat to local businesses?').
151. See WILKINSON, supra note 59, at 166 ("The timber industry in the Northwest
has been in transition for more than a decade, for reasons largely unrelated to the spotted
owl or any other environmental factor"; job losses are attributable to liquidation of the old
growth stands and slow rates of regeneration, worker productivity and exports of unproc-
essed logs); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 1991)
("Job losses in the wood products industry will continue regardless of whether the northern
spotted owl is protected ... "); Axline, supra note 54, at 614 (the timber industry will
continue to decline in spite of the brief economic boost provided by the rider).
152. See WILDERNESS SOC'Y, supra note 142, at 35-36. In addition, other enter-
prises are likely to suffer as a result of the timber rider- "By threatening the health of the
forests and the fisheries, the rider is in turn threatening the sports, commercial fishing,
and the tourism industries, all of which are economically important to the Pacific
Northwest?' 142 CONG. REc. H6635, H6663 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (statement of Rep.
McDermott).
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4. Repeal Efforts Demonstrate the Frustration of Members of
Congress with the Process Accorded the Rider
Once the true effects of the bill became apparent, the rider was
the subject of a remarkably sustained effort at repeal. Senator
Murray proposed repeal based in part on the belief that members
had been misled by the bill's sponsors.1 53 Representative Furse
sponsored a bill to repeal the rider, which was co-sponsored by
over 100 representatives, and circulated a memorandum to mem-
bers of the House identifying misrepresentations that had resulted
in the passage of the rider. 54 In addition, Representative Furse
offered language that would have modified the timber rider as an
amendment to H.R. 3662, FY 1997 Appropriations for the Depart-
ment of Interior and Related Agencies.1 5
A number of members made statements on the House floor in
support of repeal, expressing outrage at having been misled. 5 6
Others believed that repeal was appropriate because there had been
153. See 142 CONG. REc. S2006 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1996). Senator Bradley
introduced a similar measure, Senate Bill 1595, 104th Cong. (1996). See 142 CONG. Rac.
at S1603-S1605 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1996).
154. See 141 CONG. Rc. H14238 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1995) (introducing the
Restoration of Natural Resources Laws on the Public Lands Act of 1995, H.R. 2745, 104th
Cong. (1995)); Furse Press Release, supra note 124.
155. See 142 CONG. Rc. H6635, H6654-64 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (statements
of Rep. Furse and others in support of the amendment). The Furse amendment was almost
defeated on procedural grounds before it even came before the floor for consideration. The
Rules Committee recommended that Rule XXI, prohibiting attachment of substantive
legislation to appropriations bills, be enforced against the Furse amendment, H.R. REs.
455, 104th Cong. (1996), although it recommended that the rule be waived with respect
to other policy-based amendments. See 142 CONG. REC. H6518 (daily ed. June 19, 1996);
H.R. REP. No. 104-627 (1996). Of course, the salvage timber program was enacted only
because Rule XXI had been waived with respect to that provision: "it seems only fair and
reasonable to allow the House to consider terminating the program through the same means
by which it was originally enacted:' 142 CONG. REC. at H6521 (statement of Rep.
Beilenson). The House agreed to consider the Furse amendment. See id. at H6625.
156. "Although touted as an emergency measure to cut dead and dying timber, the
rider has been used to clearcut healthy forests, including some hundreds of years old,"
142 CONG. REC. at H6635, H6655 (statement of Rep. Furse); id. at H6656 (statement of
Rep. Boehlert) (this rider "was sold to this body under what can most generously be
considered false pretenses"); id. at H6660 (statement of Rep. Morella) ("The so-called
forest health justification for suspending laws is a sham"); id. at H6661 (statement of Rep.
Lowey) (the timber rider, one of many in a "shameful list" of the majority's attacks on
environmental protections, "was misleadingly touted as being necessary to reduce forest
fires .... [but] is now being used to clearcut healthy forests in the Pacific Northwest");
id. at H6662 (statement of Rep. Obey) (the rider "wound up allowing.., a lot more than
it was explained as doing .... [if the rider] in fact had been limited simply to straight
salvage, as the House was told it was, we would not have had much of the controversy
that has surrounded this ever since").
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no hearings on the timber rider at meaningful times in the deci-
sionmaking process, 5 7 and because of the lack of notice that the
rider was going to be offered anew in the Oklahoma disaster relief
package.15t
The Furse amendment was defeated, but by the narrowest of
margins. 5 9 Another measure of the unpopularity of the policy con-
tained in the rider is the fact that efforts to extend the rider have
so far been unavailing, 60 as have attempts to enact a permanent
form of the law.161
157. See id. at H6635, H6656 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (statement of Rep. Porter);
id. at H6657 (statement of Rep. Yates); id. at H6659 (statement of Rep. McDermott); id.
at H6660 (statement of Rep. Morella); id. at H6661 (statement of Rep. Blumenauer); see
also 141 CONG. REc. H3231 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995) (statement of Rep. DeFazio) ("The
issue should never have been brought to the floor in this fashion."); id. at S4881 (daily
ed. Mar. 30, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bradley) (attaching this rider to an appropriations
bill "sets an incredibly dangerous precedent"). But see 142 CONG. REc. H6635, H6658 (in
response to such criticism, Rep. Riggs noted and discussed the hearings that had taken
place months earlier in connection with a previous version of the bill).
158. See id. at H6635, H6656 (statement of Rep. Porter).
159. See id. at D648-49 (daily ed., June 20, 1996). The recorded vote was 211 to
209, see id., and at least one representative who was absent at the time of the vote later
stated that he would have voted in favor of the Furse amendment because of concerns
about the environmental and economic effects of the rider. See id. at E1160-61 (daily ed.
June 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Ramstad). Others seemed to think the issue was moot,
because section 2001(k), forcing sales of green timber in Washington and Oregon, would
expire in September 1996. See id. at H6635, H6655 (statement of Rep. Dicks); id. at
H6662 (statement of Rep. Taylor); id. at H6663 (statement of Rep. Kolbe).
160. For example, the Hatfield timber rider, set forth in the proposed 1996 Interior
appropriations bill, H.R. 1977, 104th Cong. (1996), was omitted from the Consolidated
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). See 142 CONG. REc. S4161, S4169 (daily
ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray); see also Final Deal Sealed; Key Riders
Dropped, GREENWIRE, Apr. 25, 1996, p. 4 (discussing the Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134).
161. Senate Bill 391, 104th Cong. (1996), creating a permanent salvage policy, was
sponsored by Senator Larry Craig and approved by the Senate Energy Committee on June
19, 1996, but was not allowed to go to the floor until compromises were made with the
then-ranking minority member, Senator Bill Bradley. See New USDA Policy Bars Most
Salvage Sales in Roadless Areas, PuB. LANDS NEWS, July 11, 1996, at 1-2. The Committee
released its report on July 16, 1996, but negotiations were never completed. See Glickman
to Face Senate Fire Over Timber Salvage Policy, PuB. LANDS NEWS, July 25, 1996, at 8.
The 105th Congress is considering a bill proposed by Senator Craig that would overhaul
NFMA and FLPMA. Senator Craig Issues Draft of Public Lands Management Bill for
Next Congress, 237 ENV'T RP. (BNA) at A8 (Dec. 10, 1996). The bill addresses forest
health issues, but "is not a repeat" of Craig's efforts to expand the salvage rider, according
to Senate staff. See id. The bill, now entitled the Public Land Management Responsibility
and Accountability Restoration Act, has not been formally introduced, but public hearings
and workshops are currently being held. See 143 CONG. REc. S1409 (daily ed. Feb. 13,
1997).
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IV. OTHER RECENT RIDERS DEMONSTRATE THE DANGERS POSED
BY THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS
The use of riders to provide special interest projects with
exemptions from substantive legislation is nothing new, having
been recognized as problematic by the early nineteenth century.1 62
However, the abuse of the appropriations process has been taken
to new and more extreme heights in recent decades, 63 and has been
especially prevalent in the environmental area.1 64
A. Exemptions Passed as Appropriations Riders Have
Jeopardized Public Lands and Natural Resources
Legislative short-cuts have been employed in numerous con-
texts in past legislative sessions. 65 In 1973, for example, the Trans-
Alaska oil pipeline was exempted from NEPA requirements by use
162. The practice of adding riders to appropriations bills has been "a perennial
complaint' Walter Oleszek, The Congressional Budget Process, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 731, 735 (Joel H. Silbey, ed., 1994). "By 1835 the delays
caused by injecting legislation [extraneous policy riders] into [appropriations] bills had
become serious and John Quincy Adams ... suggested that they be stripped of everything
save appropriations:' Id. (citing ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 425-26 (1935)).
163. See Jacques B. LeBouf, Limitations on the Use of Appropriations Riders by
Congress to Effectuate Policy Changes, 19 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 457, 460 (1992).
Oleszek notes that, during the partisan disputes between the Reagan White House and the
Democratic Congress of the 1980s, Congress resorted to massive "omnibus" bills that
combined Congress's priorities with some of the President's priorities to discourage
vetoes. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at 742.
164. "The vehicle of choice for insulating federal agencies from environmental laws
has been to insert obscure. . . [riders into] annual spending bills." Sher, supra note 4, at
10,469. Indeed, the FY 1989 appropriation for the Department of Interior, Pub. L. No.
100-446, 102 Stat. 1774 (1988), contained nearly 100 provisions that directly contravened
pre-existing. environmental law, or restricted the expenditure of funds on otherwise
authorized programs. See Charles Stewart III, The Appropriations Committees, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1015, 1021 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994).
165. Among these were many earlier "timber riders" presaging the particularly
damaging rider appended to the Rescissions Act. Faced with court injunctions limiting
logging operations, Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield sponsored riders each year from 1986
to 1990 to allow timber sales to go forward in spite of noncompliance with environmental
laws. Those passed include the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-88, 99 Stat. 293; Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act
for 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-446, § 321, 102 Stat. 1774, 1827 (1988); Department of the
Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 3318,
103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989). The Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act for 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-512, 104 Stat. 1915 (1990), was the first in
five years to include no such rider, in large part because 20 senators and 79 representatives
sent letters to the chairs of the appropriations committees protesting the enactment of
1989's section 318 and its predecessor, section 314. See Victor Sher & Carol Hunting,
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of an appropriations rider.166 In 1980, Congress voted to exempt the
Tennessee Valley Authority's Tellico Dam project from the Endan-
gered Species Act1 67 by the same vehicle. 168 In 1988, construction
of a multi-million-dollar observatory on Mount Graham in the
Coronado National Forest was given the blessing of an appropria-
tions rider that exempted the project from the requirements of both
the Endangered Species Act and NEPA. 169 Congress also employed
an appropriations measure to exempt a proposed highway, in Ha-
waii from the Federal Highway Act,1 70 which prohibits the use of
parklands unless no feasible alternative is available.171
Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the Laws: Congressional Exemptions from Judicial
Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 435, 487-88 (1991).
166. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 203, 87
Stat. 576, 584-85 (1973) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1652(d) (1988)), provided
that the government need not consider an alternative plan for transporting oil from Alaska
via an overland route, rather than via oil tanker at Valdez. If alternatives and effects of
the pipeline had been analyzed under NEPA, perhaps the Exxon Valdez oil spill would
have been less likely. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 165, at 440-41.
167. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
168. See Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50 (1979); H.R. 4388, 96th Cong. (1979); 125 CONG. REC.
20,979 (1979). The Tellico Dam rider prompted this response from the Supreme Court:
When voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate
under the assumption that the funds will be devoted to purposes which are
lawful and not for any purpose forbidden. Without such an assurance, every
appropriations measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering substan-
tive legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute which might pro-
hibit the expenditure. Not only would this lead to the absurd result of requiring
Members to review exhaustively the background of every authorization before
voting on an appropriation, but it would flout the very rules the Congress
carefully adopted to avoid this need.
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1978).
169. A last minute rider to the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-696, §§ 601-607, 102 Stat. 4571, 4597-99, allowed for construction of three
telescopes before completion of formal environmental reviews. See John Lancaster, Endan-
gered Squirrel Has Astronomers, Biologists at Odds, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1990, at A8. It
declared that section 7 of the Endangered Species Act "shall be deemed authorized" for
the authorization of the first three telescopes, see Pub. L. No. 100-696, § 602, and NEPA
"shall be deemed to have been satisfied," id. at § 607. See also Mount Graham Red
Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring the District Court to hear
evidence on the adequacy of the monitoring program set up to protect the endangered Mt.
Graham red squirrel in compliance with the Act).
170. See Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591,
§ 114, 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-49 (1986).
171. See Department of Transportation Act § 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 303(f) (1994)
(allowing the Secretary of Transportation to approve projects that use public park lands
only if there is no feasible alternative); see also Stop H-3 Association v. Dole, 870 F.2d
1419 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding appropriations legislation that exempted the project froiin
otherwise applicable environmental requirements).
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The 104th Congress was particularly prolific in passing sub-
stantive riders, attaching more than fifty environmental riders to
spending bills (although not all were enacted).1 72 Among those
signed into law was an environmental exemption of yet another
stage of the Mount Graham project, 73 despite fears that the obser-
vatory and telescope facilities may have an adverse effect on the
endangered red squirrel, 74 as well as on American Indian religious
and cultural practices. 175
Perhaps most alarming of all, the 104th Congress was able to
enact an across-the-board moratorium on the listing of species and
designation of critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act as
a rider to the appropriations bill for the Department of Defense. 76
The moratorium was specifically criticized on the floor of the
House as beyond the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Commit-
tee. 177 For more than a year, the rider withheld protections for
species that were severely threatened and warranted listing. 78 It
poses a striking example of the perils of enacting substantive en-
vironmental legislation through the appropriations process: a spe-
cies entitled to protection under the Act could have been driven
closer to extinction by a choice made while the Appropriations
172. See Jim Nichols, Republicans Back Off Touted Reform of Environmental Laws
in Light of Polls Showing Support for Protection of Resources, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Oct. 22, 1995, at 1B; Jerry Gray, In House, Spending Bills Open Way to Make
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1995, at A16 (proposed spending bills "would revoke or
substantially restrict nearly 20 environmental laws that have become anathema to big
business").
173. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
104-134, § 335, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
174. See Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas, 89 E3d 554, 555-56 (9th Cir. 1996)
(describing history of Mount Graham project, and legislative reactions to controversy).
175. See Elizabeth A. Brandt, The Fight for Dzil Nchaa Si An, Mt. Graham,
CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Winter 1996, at 55-57.
176. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Depart-
ment of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L, No,
104-6, 109 Stat. 73, 86. The moratorium was to expire on October 1, 1995, but continuing
resolutions kept it in place well into 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-31, 109 Stat. 278 (1995);
Pub. L. No. 104-56, 109 Stat. 548 (1995); Pub. L. No. 104-94, 110 Stat. 25 (1996); Pub.
L. 104-99, 110 Stat 26 (1996); Pub. L. No. 104-122, 110 Stat. 876 (1996); Pub. L. No.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); see also Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 918 R Supp. 318,
320 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
177. See 141 CONG. REC. H4344, H4345 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Beilenson) ("We believe that the authorizing committee and not the Committee on
Appropriations is the proper place to address this far-reaching and very critical issue."),
178. See Environmental Defense Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1995)




Committee considered the military budget. This type of decision
should clearly be made by wildlife management experts, not mem-
bers of Congress embroiled in the fiscal minutiae of the armed
forces.
B. Proposed Riders Would Have Had Far-Reaching Effects
A number of additional riders were proposed in the 104th
Congress that later failed to attain passage or were thwarted by the
veto pen. If signed into law, they would have had severe conse-
quences for natural resources and public lands.
1. Riders in the 1996 Interior Appropriations Bill
Numerous controversial riders were incorporated into the pro-
posed appropriations bill for the Department of Interior and Re-
lated Agencies for Fiscal Year 1996.179 Among them were provi-
sions that would restrict protective measures for the newly created
Mojave National Preserve, 80 increase logging in the Tongass Na-
tional Forest,181 liberalize hardrock mining on public lands, 82 and
prohibit or severely curtail a multi-region Forest Service and BLM
project for management of the Columbia River Basin Ecosystem.' 3
These riders were criticized as both unsound policy and dis-
honest politics. Representative George Miller, former chair of the
House Natural Resources Committee, echoed the criticisms of many
opponents of the riders when he labelled them "the most systematic
and comprehensive assault on the environment and the environ-
179. See H.R. 1977, 104th Cong. (1995).
180. See California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat.
4471, 4489-95 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 410aaa-41 to 410aaa-59 (1994)).
181. See infra text accompanying note 185.
182. See James Gerstenzang, White House Threatens Veto of Environmental Meas-
ure, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 23, 1995, at A3.
183. See 141 CONG. Rc. H9688 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (Rep. Furse criticized
the restriction on the Columbia River Basin Ecosystem Project and other measures to
protect fisheries habitat on national forest lands); id. at H9639, H9640 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1995) (statement of Rep. Beilenson) ("The legislation cripples a joint Forest Service-BLM
ecosystem management project for the Columbia River Basin in the Northwest, a project
intended to allow a sustainable flow of timber from that region. This provision threatens
the protection of salmon and other critical species and guarantees continued court battles
over logging in that region.").
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mental laws" in the history of the nation.184 With respect to forest
management, Representative Sidney Yates stated that
The conference report to be ratified here today will dramatically
increase logging on our already overtaxed forests .... What's
more .... [it] prevents all environmental law from being en-
forced in the Tongass . . . [and] prevents all citizens, environ-
mentalists and private land owners alike, from exercising their
rights to sue the Federal Government.1 85
The process employed to circumvent congressional rules was
characterized by critics as, among other things, "a failure to uphold
the deliberative process that underlies the American tradition of
conservation." 18 6 Ranking members of authorizing committees ex-
pressed frustration that programs that they had recommended and
that had been passed after full deliberation by both houses were
being gutted by riders. 8 7 They argued that supporters of the origi-
nal substantive laws "were not afraid to have open and honest
debate during the years it took to get th[ese] measure[s] enacted.
Opponents should allow for the same kind of exhaustive review if
they believe they have the support to repeal it. ' 181
184. See David Helvarg, Defoliating Our Green Laws: Congress Plans an American
Clearcut, NATON, Dec. 4, 1995, at 699. Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt called the riders
"an, assault.., on our natural resources and environment .... The barbecue is now under
way on natural resources." Hugh Dellios, The $1 Desert-Mojave National Preserve is
Protected on Paper But Imperiled in a Battle Over Funding, S.F. EXAMINEIR, Oct. 1, 1995,
at As; see 141 CONG. REC. H9689 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Rep. Boehlert)
("This bill represents nothing less than an assault on the environment .... [We] squander
precious resources, robbing them from future generations .... [This bill] is intolerable").
185. See 141 CONG. REc. H9685 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995).
186. Id. at H9687-88; see id. at H9692 (statement of Rep. Miller) ("What [the bill]
purports to do in the name of budget cutting is obscene. Not only is this appropriations
bill packed with authorizing legislation in a spending bill-in clear violation of House
rules-but, it also shamelessly and against the public interest runs rampant in overturning
sound environmental policy.").
187. See 141 CONG. REC. H9639, H9642 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Miller).
As an architect of the 1990 Tongass Timber Reform Act, I take special offense
at this assault on our largest national forest. These permanent changes in law
are not within the proper jurisdiction of the appropriations committees ....
The Senate language is an ill-advised attempt to turn back the clock and to
manage these public lands to favor a heavily taxpayer subsidized special
interest over all other competing users of the forest.
See id.
188. 141 CONG. REc. H6994 (daily ed. July 13, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fazio,
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In all likelihood, the riders, had they been proposed as inde-
pendent bills, would not have passed:
[T]here is a simple reason these crucial policy decisions were
tacked on to the Interior appropriations bill instead of being
considered independently: these' policies were added as riders
because on their own, they do not stand up to scrutiny. This is
bad policy based on distorted science and values. The American
people do not support it. Such change would not be sustained
in the heat of open debate.189
The Interior bill was also criticized for its perceived slant towards
private interests at the expense of the public:
This legislation, which is based on pseudoscience, fails in terms
of priorities, process, policy, and the pragmatic .... [It] con-
structs a new set of priorities in which the rights of the
American people to use and enjoy the public lands of our
Nation finish dead last behind a wide variety of special inter-
ests, in essence the users who exploit public resources. 190
Although Congress passed the bill, the President vetoed it,191 as he
had earlier threatened.1 92 Efforts to override the veto failed. 93
regarding back-door efforts to dismantle the California Desert Act). Ironically, Sen.
Wallop's efforts to change the area's status to a BLM-managed monument, subject to fewer
restrictions, failed in committee and on the floor during consideration of the substantive
bill that became the California Desert Protection Act, see 140 CoNG. REc. D1058 (daily
ed. Sept. 29, 1993); id. at S4129 (Apr. 12, 1994). For further criticism of the California
Desert rider, see Dellios, supra note 184, at As.
189. 141 CONG. REc. H9687 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Rep. Vento);
see also Dellios, supra note 184, at As ("GOP lawmakers are trying to use the budget
process to undo Democratic-backed laws and policies that the Republicans might not have
the votes to reverse one by one:' Secretary Babbitt remarked that congressional efforts to
push forward with these environmental riders were "a cynical circumvention of the
democratic process'").
190. 141 CoNG. REc. H9687 (statement of Rep. Vento); see also id. (Rep. Yates
stated that this was the first time he had refused to sign a conference report on an
appropriations bill: "Why? .... It turns over the Nation's wealth for the exploitation by
special interests.").
191. See id. at H15,057 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1995); Clinton Vetoes Interior EPA
Spending Bills, GREENWiRE, Dec. 19, 1995, at 4. The appropriations bill for the Depart-
ment of Commerce, HUD, and EPA was vetoed on the same day. See id.; Warren P. Strobel
& David R. Sands, Spending Bill Vetoes Will Keep Workers Home, WASH. TWES, Dec. 19,
1995, at Al.
192. See Gerstenzang, supra note 182; Janet Hook, House Rejects Funding Bills
Over Abortion, Mine Issues, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 30, 1995, at Al, A27; Dellios,
supra note 184, at A8. See generally Nichols, supra note 172, at lB (discussing points of
contention in Interior and EPA funding proposals).
193. See 142 CONG. REc. H120 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1996).
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2. The Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996
In the wake of the President's veto, appropriations for the
Department of Interior, along with four other departmental appro-
priations that had been vetoed or had not passed both chambers, 94
became part of the Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations
Act of 1996. As initially introduced, the Interior provisions again
generated controversy.195
Many of the proposed bill's environmental provisions were
revised before the Act was passed and enacted in April 1996, with
the federal government facing yet another partial shut-down.1 96 In
response to concerns raised by the Administration, several riders
originally attached to the Interior bill were either significantly
revised or omitted. 97 For example, a provision that would have
194. See id. at S4161, S4167 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hollings)
(discussing the veto of the bill for the Commerce, Justice, and State Departments).
195. See id. at H1808, H1867 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Yates)
("[T]his is the same bill that.., the President wisely vetoed .... It mandates increased
logging . . . [and] contains a moratorium on adding new plants and animals to the
endangered species list"); id. at H1869 (statement of Rep. Miller) ('The bill is riddled
with punitive provisions which have little or nothing to do with the budget and everything
to do with antienvironmental policies."); see also id. at S2302, S2304 (daily ed. Mar. 19,
1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer) (noting that she would vote against the bill because of
riders that would "block new drinking water standards; prohibit the EPA from enforcing
a rule on reformulated gasoline; ... undermine wetland protection; prohibit the issuance
of new energy efficiency standards; [and] limit the listing of new Superfund sites"; as well
as riders that would prohibit abortion).
196. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). When it became apparent that
a bill was soon to pass that would likely be enacted, Senator Daschle remarked: 'This has
been a very long, difficult struggle. Seven months, two Government shutdowns and 13
continuing resolutions later, we resolved many of these extraordinarily difficult and
contentious issues in a way that I feel has done a real service to the Senate," 142 CoNG.
Rac. S4161 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996); see id. at S4169 (Sen. Murray stating that "It's
unfortunate that it took two Government shut-downs, innumerable furloughs, and need-
lessly bitter partisan disputes, before we reached the path of resolution: serious bipartisan
negotiations .... [The Federal Budget should not be balanced through] quick and dirty
gimmicks.").
197. See 142 CoNG. REc. S4156, S4158 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996). For a discussion
of the negotiations and enactment of the Omnibus Act, see Jackie Calmes & David Rogers,
Historic Budget Battle Ends with a Whimper, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1996, at A14; Congress
Ends Bitter Fight Over FY '96 Bill, GREENWIRE, Apr. 26, 1996, at 4. Throughout the
negotiations, environmental riders proved to be the main problem with the omnibus bill
according to White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta. See House OKs Short-Term CR;
Omnibus Bill Talks Continue, CONG. DAILY, Apr. 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL
10090671; see also 142 CONG. REC. S4169 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Murray) ("[T]his cleaner bill represents a victory for all of us who care about the health
of our environment and protection of natural resources.").
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extended the salvage rider was dropped,198 and the scope of the
Columbia River Basin Ecosystem rider was substantially limited. 199
Several riders regarding EPA authority were also dropped,
including one stripping the EPA of its ability to overrule Corps of
Engineers decisions on wetlands. 2°0 The final Act did, however,
contain some restrictions on EPA programs such as additional list-
ings under CERCLA,201 along with several significant non-environ-
mental riders. 202
The Consolidated Act is an unusual piece of legislation be-
cause it allowed the President to waive several of its riders if he
determined that suspension was appropriate, based upon the public
interest in sustainable environmental management or the protection
of cultural, biological, or historic resources.203 Riders subject to
waiver included provisions that would prohibit the listing of spe-
cies under the Endangered Species Act,20 4 require the National Park
Service to allow traditional multiple use practices historically con-
doned by the BLM on the Mojave National Preserve,205 and allow
certain timber sales to be offered in the Tongass National Forest
198. See 142 CONG. REC. S4182-83 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996); see also Final Deal
Sealed: Key Riders Dropped, GREENWIRE, Apr. 25, 1996, at 2.
199. As enacted, this provision simply prohibits the extension of the Project to
activities on non-federal lands. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 314, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996);
H.R. CONF. REP, No. 104402, Amend. 152 (1995); see also 142 CONG. REc. S4161, S4169
(daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray) ("Now, the Columbia Basin
Ecosystem Project can go forward, providing resource managers with comprehensive,
scientific information about how best to protect the land . . . and proactively address
resource management before it [sic] we face a debilitating crisis."); id. at S4167 (statement
of Sen. Craig) (expressing disappointment that provision did not pass as originally
proposed).
200. See 142 CONG. REc. at S4159 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (regarding the proposed
Veterans Administration and Housing and Urban Development appropriations bill); id. at
S2302, S2307-08 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (detailing Sen. Chafee's objections to the
wetlands rider).
201. The Act restricts the listing of additional facilities on the National Priorities
List under CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1996), until legislation reauthorizing
CERCLA is enacted, and limits the listing of toxicological profiles on the Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry under CERCLA § 104(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i). See Pub. L. No.
104-134, § 101, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); Helvarg, supra note 184, at 699.
202. For example, it prohibits funding for most abortions and registration of
unmarried domestic partners in the District of Columbia. See Pub. L. No. 104-134,§§ 131-132, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); 142 CONG. REc. H3842, H3866 (daily ed. Apr. 25,
1996).
203. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 119(b), § 325(c), § 2901(c), 110 Stat. 1321,
159-60 (1996).
204. See § 2901.
205. See § 119.
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"notwithstanding any other provision of law" and without oppor-
tunity for judicial review. 2 6 President Clinton suspended the opera-
tion of all three provisions. 207 Non-waivable provisions, on the
other hand, impose a moratorium on the processing of patent ap-
plications under the general mining laws208 and delay implementa-
tion of grazing reform regulations. 209
3. The Balanced Budget Act of 1995
The Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995,210 as passed
by both chambers, contained a particularly objectionable provision
opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas explo-
ration and extraction.211 In fact, the version of the rider that was
reported by the House.Committee on Budget exempted exploration
and development in the Refuge from all environmental laws.212
Ongoing debate over the classification and use of the Refuge has
resulted in numerous unsuccessful proposals to open the Refuge's
coastal plain to oil and gas drilling.213 At least two such bills have
failed in the past ten years.214 Yet, the appropriations process al-
206. See § 325.
207. See Marla Cone, Endangered Species List Ready to Grow, Los ANGELES TIMEs,
May 10, 1996, at A3; Clinton Waives Three Riders; Some Riders Remain, GREENWIRE,
Apr. 29, 1996, at 6.
208. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 322.
209. See id., § 329.
210. H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. (1995).
211. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-350, at 100 (§ 5333) (1995).
212. See H.R. REP. No. 104-280, at 66 (vol. I § 9002(h)) (1995).
213. The ongoing debate over the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge has been char-
acterized as
at its best, a part of the debate between differing values and visions for the
future integrity of life on Earth. At its worst, it is a raging political struggle
between one vision that seeks to develop sustainable ways to live with and
protect our wild natural heritage as a fundamental underpinning to life on
Earth and another vision that seeks to allow the unlimited acquisition and use
of natural resources to feed market driven systems that have no innate
sustainability toward [sic] the natural world.
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Hearings on H.R. 2491 Before the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, 104th Cong. 70 (1995) (statement of G. Jon Roush, President, The
Wilderness Society) [hereinafter Statement of Roush].
214. See Nichols, supra note 172, at 1B; Richard J. Fink, The National Wildlife
Refuges: Theory, Practice and Prospect, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 33, nn.216-28(1994); 141 CONG. REc. S6736, S6738 (daily ed. May 16, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone); Allan Freedman, Supporters of Drilling See an Opening, 53 CON. Q. WKLY.
REP. 2440, 2440 (Aug. 12, 1995) ("The debate has sizzled ever since... 1980").
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lowed the allies of two powerful congressmen from Alaska (chair-
men of committees that had failed to pass the provisions) to avoid
the spotlight and procedural safeguards of the normal legislative proc-
ess,2 15 making the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge rider one of the
104th Congress's most egregious example of legislative mischief.
The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge was created thirty-five
years ago in northeast Alaska "to protect its unique wildlife, wil-
derness, and recreational values."2 1 6 The rider would undoubtedly
jeopardize the integrity of the refuge, which is "a world treasure
of ecologically pristine wilderness"2 17 containing a rich diversity of
wildlife and its habitat.2 1 8 The area that would be opened to explo-
ration and development is "the biological heart . . . of the ref-
uge"' 219 It is also critical to the subsistence of the native Gwich'in
peoples due to the presence of the Porcupine Caribou herd, an
important subsistence resource.220
Although the public overwhelmingly opposes drilling in the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,221 the appropriations process en-
215. See Freedman, supra note 214, at-2440 (reporting that the strategy of chairmen
Young and Murkowski (R-Alaska) to put the measure in the omnibus bill "would give
them an edge in the Senate because the reconciliation bill, which reconciles tax and
spending policies with deficit-reduction goals, cannot be filibustered. It also could blunt a
threatened veto from President Clinton:').
216. Statement of Roush, supra note 213, at 70. In 1980, Congress doubled the size
of the protected area to over 19 million acres and designated 8 million acres as wilderness.
See id. At that time, one and a half million acres of coastal plain, known as the 1002 area,
were set aside for further study, protecting it until Congress passes an Act to either
permanently protect it as wilderness or to develop whatever oil potential may exist in the
area. See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA"), 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3142-3143 (1994).
217. Statement of Roush, supra note 213, at 69.
218. See id. Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt strongly opposed development in
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge because exploration and development would perma-
nently alter the area. See Freedman, supra note 214, at 2441.
219. Statement of Roush, supra note 213, at 69.
220. "What happens to the Arctic Refuge is not only an environmental issue. It is
a human rights issue too, because the survival of the Gwich'in culture depends on the
protection of the birthplace of the Porcupine Caribou Herd [sic]. It is [about] the basic
tribal right we have to carry on our tradition[al] ways:' Leasing of the 1002 Area of the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to the Oil Exploration and Development Industry: Hearing
on H.R.2491 Before the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. 60 (1995) (statement
of Sarah James, Netsi Gwich'in, Arctic Village, Alaska). See also Statement of Roush,
supra note 213 at 69 ('The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge is internationally recognized
for the extraordinary values that sustain unique wildlife populations and the subsistence
like ways of the Gwich'in Athapaskan Indians."). Regarding the position of Alaska Native
corporations, see Hearing on H.R.2491, supra, at 60 (statement of Oliver Leavitt, Vice-
President, Arctic Slope Regional Corporation).
221. See 142 CONG. REc. 55521, S5528 (daily ed. May 23, 1996) (statement of Sen.
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abled a small handful of legislators to pervert the system to pass
this rider.22 2 It was characterized by its opponents as an irrespon-
sible attempt to effectuate long-term prioritization of the nation's
limited natural resources without public debate and full considera-
tion by the appropriate authorizing committees and members of
Congress.2 23
While it falls to representative government to responsibly bal-
ance out and resolve these conflicts through an open democratic
process, we are far away from seeing that responsibility applied
in how Congress is currently acting on the future of not only
the Arctic Refuge, but all of our public lands .... The attempt
to develop the Arctic Refuge [through the appropriations proc-
ess] is a major symbol of that failure in public responsibility.224
Despite immense pressure to sign the Balanced Budget Act and
avoid another government shut-down, the President vetoed it, based
in large part on the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge provision.225
In May 1996, the House Budget Committee once again pro-
posed budgetary reconciliation legislation that would open the Arc-
tic National Wildlife Refuge for exploration.2 26 The Senate's amend-
Exon) (vast majority of Americans oppose development of the Refuge for oil and gas
drilling).
222. Even members of the appropriations committees objected: "In sum, the major-
ity's text-which has not been the subject of any public hearings-seeks to avoid
environmental lawsuits and public process by exempting the [Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge] leasing from environmental laws. It also exempts [the Refuge] from the basic laws
governing oil and gas leasing... which apply even to less sensitive public lands elsewhere
in the country." H.R. REP. No. 104-280, at 990 (1995) (Minority, Additional and Dissent-
ing Views to Title IX); see 141 CONG. REc. S16,014, S16,025 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995)(statement of Sen. Bradley) ("This approach relies on political myopia ... and fails to
withstand the straight face test. Only by railroading . . [the Refuge rider] through the
Senate, under the very restrictive and controlled conditions of budget reconciliation, would
... [it] ever have a chance of becoming law.").
223. See 141 CONG. REC. S16,024 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Bradley) ("If we go ahead with the development of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,
we damage, probably irrevocably a unique, world-class ecosystem. We consume utterly a
non-renewable resource .... I, frankly, reject any claim that our children will thank us
for using up this oil and running oil rigs and oil pipelines across the Arctic Plain.... Our
children are not asking us to sell off their collective inheritance:').
224. Statement of Roush, supra note 213, at 69.
225. See 141 CONG. REC. H14,136-37 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (President's veto
message to Congress) ("I want to protect this biologically rich wilderness permanently. I
am also concerned that the Congress has chosen to use the reconciliation bill as a catch-all
for various objectionable natural resource and environmental policies.").
226. See Concurrent Resolution for the Budget for FY 1997, H. CON. REs. 178,
104th Cong. (1996) (establishing budget targets for FY 1998-2002).
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ments to the bill omitted the Arctic National Widllife Refuge provi-
sion,227 but pressure to develop the Refuge continues.
228
C. 1997 Appropriations Bills Contain Fewer Riders
Congress once again failed to pass a general appropriations
bill for the Department of Interior for fiscal year 1997. Interior
appropriations had been under consideration as an independent
bil 2 29 up until just a few days before the end of the fiscal year,230
when it became apparent that passage was unlikely and that a
Continuing Resolution or omnibus package would be necessary.
23 1
The House then wrapped the Interior bill with four others that had
been stalled, in part due to controversial riders, in the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act.232
227. See S. CON. REs. 57, 104th Cong. (1996); 142 CONG. REc. H6247, H6268
(daily ed. June 12, 1996); 142 CONG. REc. S6167-86 (daily ed. June 13, 1996); Congress
Lays Plans for Another Reconciliation Bill (Arctic National Wildlife Refuge?), PUB. LANDS
NEws, June 27, 1996, at 6.
228. See 142 CONG. REc. S10,583-84 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1996) (Sen. Murkowski
suggested that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and the instability of Middle Eastern
oil sources, justify opening domestic oil fields, including the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge). The conflict appears certain to be a significant one in the 105th Congress. Bills
have recently been introduced in both the House and the Senate that would designate the
Refuge as a wilderness area, see House Bill 900, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposed by Rep.
Vento) and Senate Bill 531, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposed by Sen. Roth), but pro-devel-
opment forces promise renewed legislation to allow leasing. See PUBLIC LANDS NEWS,
April 17, 1997, at 8 (indicating that this could be proposed as a stand-alone bill or as a
rider to an omnibus budget bill).
229. H.R. 3662, 104th Cong. (1996).
230. See 142 CoNG. REc. D743 (daily ed. July 12, 1996). See also S. Rep. 104-319;
142 CONG. REc. S7886 (daily ed. July 16, 1996); Panetta Issues Wish List as Spending
Talks Start, CONG. DAiLY/AM, Sept. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11367542 [herein-
after Panetta Issues Wish List].
231. See Senate Fails to Act on Money Bill, Raising Omnibus Specter, PuB. LANDS
NEws, Aug. 8, 1996, at 5; Eric Pianin, Butting Heads Over Spending-Again, WASH. POST,
Sept. 16, 1996, at A9; Jessica Mathews, Two Tasks for Congress, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
1996, at A15; Panetta Issues Wish List, supra note 230.
232. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). The Omnibus Act includes
appropriations for Defense, Labor, Commerce-Justice-State, Foreign Operations, Interior,
and Treasury-Postal-White House operations. It was passed on September 30, 1996, and
signed into law just hours before FY 1997 began. See Clinton Signs Spending Bill
Following Passage in Senate, CONG. DAILY, Oct. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10091548
[hereinafter Clinton Signs Spending Bill]. Riders generated turmoil over most, if not all,
of these bills. For example, the Treasury Department bill was shelved in Congress because
of irreconcilable differences over provisions prohibiting abortion coverage for federal
workers and health care "gag rules." See Stephen Barr & Eric Pianin, Treasury Appropria-
tions Bill is Put Aside in Divided Senate, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1996, at A20; Stephen
Barr & Helen Dewar, Senate Continues Abortion Ban for Federal Workers Insurance,
WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1996, at A6.
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Prior to consolidation, the House version of the Interior bill
had included substantially fewer legislative riders than the FY96
bill, a fact attributed both to eagerness to complete business and
begin political campaigns, 2 3 and to the negative public reaction to
the previous year's environmental attacks. 2 4 The House bill none-
theless contained large funding shortfalls for national parks, endan-
gered species programs, implementation of the Northwest Forest
Plan, energy conservation, and American Indian programs. 235 The
Senate Appropriations Committee amended the bill to increase fund-
ing,236 but added riders that would waive tribal sovereign immunity,
allocate money directly to Indian tribes (bypassing the Bureau of
Indian Affairs) and delay implementation of the Tongass Forest
Plan.2
37
In addition to adding billions of dollars in additional domestic
discretionary funding in response to the Administration's demands,238
the final version of the Act dropped a number of riders that had
been appended to the individual appropriations bills, including the
two that governed tribal funding and sovereign immunity.239 It also
added some new riders, including one waiving the requirements of
the Endangered Species Act and NEPA for construction of border
fencing to control illegal immigration,240 another creating the Opal
233. See Eric Pianin, Congress Finishes Major Legislation, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
1996, at Al.
234. See Nichols, supra note 172, at lB.
235. See 142 CONG. REc. H6518, 6522 (daily ed. June 19, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Beilenson) ("[T]he Republican leadership's spending priorities ... shortchange... programs
that protect our Nation's resources for our children and our grandchildren .... Th[e] bill
... denies future generations the legacy we believe we would all like to leave behind:
abundant natural resources, a clean and well-protected environment, and a cultural richness
that all Americans can enjoy."). Secretary Babbitt recommended that the President veto
the bill if it contained drastic funding shortfalls for Endangered Species Act programs and
clean-up of abandoned mines. See House Spending Bill Due for Veto; Money is a Major
Issue, PuB. LANDS Naws, June 27, 1996, at 2; see also Senate Interior Appropriations Bill
Facing Veto Threat, CONG. DAILY/AM, Sept. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11367534(predicting showdowns on grazing and other natural resources issues; Tongass rider
attacked as an unconstitutional encroachment on executive authority).
236. See S. RP. No. 104-319 (1996).
237. See id. at § 135-136 (Tongass rider), § 118 (tribal allocation), § 329 (tribal
immunity).
238. See Clinton Signs Spending Bill, supra note 232.
239. The Act consists of over 2000 pages of legislation; some noted that it was
doubtful whether a single member of Congress had read the entire bill, given its length
and the short period of time in which it had been compiled. See 142 CONG. REc. S 11,835
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Inhofe).
240. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-863 at 567 (1996) (Div. C, Title I, § 102(c)); 142
CONG. REC. S11,711 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simpson) (applauding
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Creek Wilderness and Recreation Area,241 and yet another transfer-
ring 5,000 acres of land to the Coquille Indian Tribe.2
42
V. APPROPRIATIONS RIDERS THREATEN THE INTEGRITY OF
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT BY PRECLUDING PUBLIC
INVOLVEMENT AND INFORMED DEBATE ON CRITICAL POLICY
ISSUES
As the riders explored above make clear, policy-oriented pro-
visions added during the appropriations process can have a dra-
matic impact on the operation of targeted statutes. The inclusion
of riders is not, of course, the only leverage appropriations com-
mittees have over the agencies they oversee. Appropriations com-
mittees' control over allocational decisions may give them almost
as much influence over the implementation of federal programs as
the legislative committees that authorized them.243 However, the
"power of the purse," while substantial, does not extend to the
outright reversal of agency policy.2 "
inclusion of border control rider so that presence of endangered species, such as the
California gnat catcher, would not delay fence construction).
241. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-863, at 538 (Div. B, Title I, § 104); Brent Walth,
Hatfield Gets Wish for Opal Creek, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 2, 1996, at Al (Senator
Hatfield, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, insisted on the inclusion of
several riders affecting lands in Oregon in the final budget bill. Hatfield's position "allowed
him to slip the Opal Creek provisions into the final spending bill:').
242. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-863, at 552 (Div. B, Title V, § 501); Courtenay
Thompson, Indian Tribes Face Hurdles on Land Shifts, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 2,
1996, at Dl; see also Kathy Durbin, Opal Creek is Blowing in the (Political) Wind, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 16, 1996, at 2 (reporting that environmental groups withdrew
support for the Opal Creek provision when Senator Hatfield tied it to the Coquille
"giveaway").
243. See Stewart, supra note 164, at 1017. Appropriations committees have a degree
of oversight "unmatched elsewhere in Congress." Id. at 1021. Just as agency programs do
not become real until they are enforced, legislative measures lack substance until they are
funded. See J. William Futrell, The Administration of Environmental Law, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 71, 77 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds.,
1993) [hereinafter Administration]. For example, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671 (1994), was effectively crippled by a lack of appropriations from 1982 to 1990, and
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994), went unauthorized for
nearly a decade. See id.; Sher, supra note 4.
244. See LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 475. It would appear that the Framers of our
bicameral and tripartite system anticipated that appropriations allocations would provide
a check on executive spending. See THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (James Madison). It is
doubtful, however, that they intended for appropriations committees-separate and distinct
from authorizing committees who are likely to be more conversant in their particular
field-to wield such power over executive programs. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at
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The use of policy-oriented riders, on the other hand, can ef-
fectively force an agency to take action contrary to its authorizing
mandate. Because of the absence of safeguards in the appropria-
tions process, such dramatic policy changes can be achieved with
little opportunity for consideration or debate. Riders can also be
employed to force the President to capitulate to the legislature's
demands when normal legislative routes would be stymied by the
threat of veto.245
This section examines the normal legislative processes for
enacting legislation and finds that these processes provide proce-
dural and substantive safeguards that are absent when riders are
appended to appropriations bills. It concludes that the appropria-
tions, process is a poor vehicle for balancing competing interests
and establishing national priorities.2 46
A. Normal Legislative Processes Encourage Full and Informed
Consideration of Substantive Policies and Priorities
The normal process for the consideration of legislation in
Congress-committee research, drafts, review, and recommenda-
tion, followed first by floor debate and passage in each chamber,
then conference reports and bicameral adoption-provides many
opportunities for public scrutiny and for consideration by members
interested in the subject matter of the bill.247 With respect to legis-
lation that did not originate in their own committees, members are
provided with their best (and sometimes only) opportunity to shape
public policy through amendments and votes on the floor.2 48 Floor
debate, hearings, and committee consideration are the "components
of the legislative process that are most likely to reveal misrepre-
737-38 (quoting Senator Hubert Humphrey, disputing the view that the constitutional
requirement that appropriations be "made by law" meant that they must be made by
appropriations committees).
245. See Stewart, supra note 164, at 1015.
246. Parts III and IV, supra, demonstrate that appropriations riders are especially
ill-suited for managing valuable, but limited, natural resources held in trust for the benefit
of the public and future generations,
247. For a detailed discussion of the legislative process in Congress, see generally
Stanley Bach, Legislating: Floor and Conference Procedures in Congress, in 2 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 701-20 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994); WALTER J.
OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS (4th ed. 1996).
248. See Bach, supra note 247, at 708.
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sentations, false assumptions, and problems with ambiguous lan-
guage. 249
Initially, most policy matters are delegated to committees with
jurisdiction over the issues involved.2 0 Environmental issues are
divided into a myriad of committees with often overlapping juris-
diction.25 1 In the Senate, environmental and natural resources issues
are governed by Committees on Energy and Natural Resources,
Agriculture, Environment and Public Works, and, inevitably, Ap-
propriations. In the House, relevant committees include Energy and
Commerce, Agriculture, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Science,
Space and Technology, and Appropriations. 2 2
The congressional process is Strengthened by delegating the
investigation and consideration of complex environmental issues to
committees with expertise in a bill's specific subject matter.2 53 Fur-
ther, the distribution of authority among congressional committees
creates numerous points of access to decisionmakers, and, argu-
ably, greater accountability and response to feedback. The over-
sight of interested committees and subcommittees ensures that no
single chairperson-subject to the local interests of his constituents
and pressures of lobbyists and contributors-has a "lock" on envi-
ronmental issues, and that various perspectives are heard, researched,
249. Axline, supra note 54, at 638. See generally Sher & Hunting, supra note 165.
250. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between committees and their
chambers, and the distribution and exercise of power in the decisionmaking process in
Congress, see STEVEN S. SMITH AND CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CON-
GRESS (2d ed. 1990).
251. See Futrell, supra note 243, at 75-77 (citing THEODORE J. LowI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979)). For example, 11 House and 9 Senate committees, including
nearly 100 separate subcommittees, oversee EPA. See Thomas L. Adams, Jr. & M.
Elizabeth Cox, The Environmental Shell Game and the Need for Codification, 20 ENVTL.
L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367 (1990).
252. See Futrell, supra note 243, at 75-77. Environmental issues have been the
subject of specialization in the various House and Senate committees for decades. During
the 1960s, in the Senate, the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Environment
and Public Works Committee asserted jurisdiction over air and water pollution, including
oil pollution in navigable waters. See Muskie, supra note 26, at 176-78. House committees
that governed air and water pollution and solid waste legislation included the Public Works
Committee and Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, while the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee retained jurisdiction over oil pollution. See id. at 177-78.
Meanwhile, the Interior Committees were responsible for management of natural re-
sources. See id. Executive agencies are similarly situated: environmental regulation comes
under the jurisdiction of EPA, while natural resources issues are handled by .the Depart-
ment of Agriculture (Forest Service) and the Department, of Interior (Bureau of Land
Management, National Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service). See Futrell, supra
note 243, at 79-80.
253. See id. at 75-78.
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and considered by legislators responsible for protecting the full
range of public interests. The usual legislative process "improve[s]
final legislative products and allow[s] dissenters to fine-tune lan-
guage and challenge assumptions. 254
This process is not immune from criticism. A common com-
plaint is that public policy decisionmaking is sometimes piecemeal
and uncoordinated.25 5 One reason is the committee process itself,
which can result in fragmented consideration of the issues. Dis-
persed authority can also result in infighting, competition and lack
of cooperation, and can impede comprehensive strategic leader-
ship.25 6
In addition, Congress's efforts have been described as static
and unresponsive to the needs of the public.25 7 To the chagrin of
254. Axline, supra note 54, at 632.
255. See Adams & Cox, supra note 251, at 10,367; Muskie, supra note 26, at 172
(arguing that because "public' concern and scientific knowledge first focused legislative
and administrative attention on the environmental crisis in piecemeal stages, the patterns
of congressional and executive jurisdiction have reflected that approach").
256. Committee consideration is further "complicated by regional and party alli-
ances within each committee.' Futrell, supra note 243, at 75. "As the importance of
environmental protection becomes more obvious, its attractiveness as a political and
legislative issue increases, and the muddy waters of committee jurisdiction in Congress
become more muddy." Muskie, supra note 26, at 176. As a result, "jurisdictional disputes
between committees could have a damaging effect on our efforts to solve the environ-
mental crisis." Id. at 180; see also David W. Brady, Constitutional and Political Con-
straints on Congressional Policy-Making: A Historical Perspective, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYsTEM 873, 876-78 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994).
257. One commentator accuses Congress of "seem[ing] to exhibit a persistent
inability to legislate any major policy changes at all." Brady, supra note 256, at 873. It
typically takes years for comprehensive environmental legislation to work its way through
the authorizing committees and floor amendment and debate. For example, efforts to
reauthorize the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA, or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994), for which funding authorizations
expired in 1994, see Pub. L. No. 101-508 § 6301, 104 Stat. 1388-319 (1990) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9611), have taken nearly three years, and the end to the debate
is not yet in sight. For a sampling of the extensive deliberations that have taken place in
authorizing committees and on the floor of both houses, see 140 CONG. REC. S1058-86
(daly ed. Feb. 7, 1994) (introducing Senate Bill 1834, 103d Cong. (1994)); id. at S12,216
(daily ed. Aug. 19, 1994) (referring Senate Bill 1834 to the Finance Committee); id. at
D1151 (Finance committee reporting favorably on Senate Bill 1834); id. at S 13,560 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1994) (statement of Sen. Gorton, discussing history of congressional efforts
and urgent need for reform); 142 CONG. REc. H4438 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement
of Rep. Gutknecht on urgency of reform); id. at H8029 (daily ed. July 18, 1996)
(introducing House Bill 3849, 104th Cong. (1996)). Superfund's predecessor, the original
CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), expired in September 1985. Efforts
to reform the statute in 1985-86 consumed the attention of seven different congressional
committees over almost two years; a stopgap measure was required to keep the program
intact while numerous hearings, debates, and conference committee meetings were held.
See ALLAN J. TOPEL AND REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE 13-14
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those in the majority, the hallmark of Congress has been "continu-
ity, stability, and incremental policy development, not rapid and
sweeping change' 258 Indeed, the bicameral system established by
the Founders and encapsulated in the Constitution2 9 was a response
to the concern that a hasty and potentially tyrannical majority in
the House of Representatives would act "too quickly and chaoti-
cally" 260 if left to its own devices; ;the Senate, an indirectly elected
upper house, would "use reason and judgment to temper the lower
house's expected haste and extremism' 261
However imperfect, these safeguards operate to encourage con-
sidered policymaking and public involvement. Although the dura-
tion and number of debates on a particular bill are not proof of its
ultimate quality or long-term viability, extended discussions in-
volving a range of perspectives provide at least some assurance
that troubling issues will be resolved in a manner that protects the
public interest.262
B. Public Involvement and Reasoned Decisionmaking Are
Short-Circuited in the Appropriations Process
Aspirations for comprehensive review, embodied in the legisla-
tive structure, are defeated when policy matters are decided through
riders added to appropriations bills. Inadequate enforcement of
existing rules, a willingness to waive rules, and the growing use
of omnibus Continuing Resolutions in the appropriations process
(1992). The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 was finally signed
into law on October 17, 1986. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675).
258. Brady, supra note 256, at 873-74; see id. at 878 (discussing why major policy
changes rarely occur in Congress), id. at 879-82 (describing "electoral realignments"
which occur when popular voter revolution has a significant impact on the governing
process, as the exception to the general premise, and suggesting that three realignments
had occurred in American history prior to 1993 in response to slavery, industrialization,
and the Great Depression and New Deal). Perhaps historians and constitutional scholars
in future years will include the 1994 election and Republican "Contract with America" as
a fourth realignment).
259. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-3.
260. Brady, supra note 256, at 873-74.
261. Id. at 873.
262. Justice Louis Brandeis put it most aptly: "Publicity is justly commended as a
remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman:' Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
89 (1995), cited with approval in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976), and Bruce
Babbitt, Springtime for Polluters, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1995, at C2.
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allow substantive riders to flourish, undermining the goal of delib-
erative government. This is particularly damaging when the appro-
priations process is used to dictate complex substantive issues, like
environmental policy, that would greatly benefit from the give and
take of the normal legislative process.2 63 Even environmental leg-
islation that is fairly discrete receives far greater consideration in
committees and on the floor264 than does an appropriations rider.265
1. Existing Rules Fail to Limit Abuse of Substantive Riders
Congressional procedures play a critical role in ensuring that
issues are given informed consideration.2 66 "The legislative proce-
dures of the House and Senate are not merely the neutral mechan-
ics of the lawmaking process; they can have important and some-
times decisive policy consequences. 267 Yet nothing in the Constitu-
tion expressly ensures that public policy matters are given full
consideration by Congress. Congress is left largely free to govern
itself;26 each house may adopt its own procedural rules, and decide
263. See Bolduan, supra note 59, at 370-72.
264. See discussion supra note 257 and accompanying text.
265. For example, the 1995 timber salvage rider was considered over a total of four
months. It was first disclosed in the committee report for House Bill 1159, 104th Cong.
(1995) (a forerunner to the Rescissions Act, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194 (1995)) on
March 8, 1995. See H. REP. 104-71 (1995), It was introduced on the House floor on March
14, see 141 CONG. REc. H3148-56 (daily ed., 1995), debated sporadically over the next
two days, and passed by the full House on March 16. See id. at H3159. The rider received
similar treatment in the Senate. See 141 CONG. REc. S4761 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1995); id.
at S5378-80 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995); see also id. at H5317-18 (daily ed. May 18, 1995);
id. at S7371-81 (daily ed. May 24, 1995) (discussing conference report). House Bill 1158,
104th Cong. (1995)-the version emerging from the conference committee-was vetoed
after passage. It was reintroduced in modified form as House Bill 1944, 104th Cong.(1995), which passed the full House on June 29, see 141 CONG. REc. H6643-44 (daily
ed. June 29, 1995), was considered on the Senate floor on July 20-21, and passed the
Senate on July 21, 1995. See id. at S1O,462-67 (daily ed. July 21, 1995).
266. See Bach, supra note 247, at 702 ("[A]ssemblies that approve policies without
the benefit of adequate and informed debate are properly derided as rubber-stamp bodies
that merely ratify decisions made elsewhere.').
267. Id. at 718. The most important issue about a bill may actually be settled with
the disposition of "an ostensibly procedural question" even before debate on the merits of
the bill itself commences. Id. at 715. As a result, proposals to reform House and Senate
procedural rules "can provoke floor debates as heated and vituperative as those over the
most contentious issues of national or international policy .... Changes in the procedures
... can redistribute the balance of power within the House or Senate in fundamental and
lasting ways ... (and] affect a wide array of policy choices not only for the present but
for the unforeseeable future... Id. at 718.
268. In comparison, the vast majority of state constitutions contain fairly detailed
procedural limitations on the legislative process. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitu'
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how it will interpret and enforce them.269 Each may also amend or
repeal its rules, or waive or suspend them on any given bill.270 As
a result, "members remain in almost total control of how they
conduct their business,"'"71 ignoring, if they choose, mechanisms
that provide for public input and informed deliberation.
Almost from the date of their inception,2 72 appropriations com-
mittees have been criticized for overstepping their bounds and
adding extraneous policy riders to their bills, which "undercut the
prerogatives of other standing committees."2 73 Indeed, current House
and Senate rules provide that appropriations bills cannot contain
new policy directives or modify existing substantive law.274 This is
tional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement,
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797, 798-99 (1987). Many state constitutions prohibit the legislature
from attaching substantive riders to general appropriations bills. See, e.g., ALA. CONST.
art. IV, § 71; ARiz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 12; ILL. CONST.
art. IV, § 8(d); LA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 56. Others strictly
prohibit the inclusion of multiple subjects in bills. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9;
N.D. CONsT. art. IV, § 33. Courts have invalidated substantive appropriations riders under
such single subject provisions. See Cal. Labor Fed'n AFL-CIO v. Occupational Safety and
Health Standards Bd., 5 Cal. App. 4th 985 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
269. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings."). The standing rules adopted by the Senate remain in force from year to
year until the Senate affirmatively decides to revise them, but the House adopts its rules
anew at the beginning of each Congress. See Bach, supra note 247, at 701.
270. See Bach, supra note 247, at 702.
271. Id. at 701. For the few examples of general legislative requirements, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONsT. amend. XX, § 2 (Congress, shall
assemble at least once a year); id. at § 7, cl. 1 (revenue bills must originate in the House
of Representatives).
272. The House established an Appropriations and Banking Committee in 1865, and
the Senate created its Appropriations Committee in 1867. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at
733.
273. Id. at 733. Past congresses attempted to use riders to deprive slaves of the right
to vote (by prohibiting the use of federal troops to protect them at the polls) and to rid
the federal government of "subversive" employees suspected of Communist affiliations.
See LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 471-72 (riders that would have affected voting rights
were vetoed by President Hayes, and the Supreme Court, in United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303 (1946), struck down the rider that targeted federal employees as a bill of attainder
prohibited by U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3). The practice of "rider-tacking" has been
employed even more frequently in recent years, in many important public policy areas.
See discussion supra Parts IV.A-.B.
274. See Standing Rules of the U.S. Senate, Rule 16(4), in COMMITTEE ON RULES
AND ADMINISTRATION, SENATE MANUAL 624 (1995); Rules of the House of Repre-
sentatives, Rule XXI(2), in CHARLES W. JOHNSON, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL,
AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 624 (1995). See generally C. CANNON,
PROCEDURE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 1834 (1936). The provision barring
substantive riders was reaffirmed by the House in the 104th Congress, and a provision was
added that prohibits the attachment of non-emergency matters in an appropriations bill
containing an emergency designation under the Budget Act. See Rules of the House of
Representatives, Rule XXI(2)(e), supra; H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong. § 215(b) (1995) (en-
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a long-standing prohibition; it was initially adopted in the House
in the late 1830s, and the Senate quickly followed suit.275
The distinction between substantive law and appropriations is
intended to enable appropriations committees to concentrate on
financial issues and, perhaps more importantly, "to prevent them
from trespassing on substantive legislation. '276 Thus, the appropria-
tions process is not to be used as a "vehicle . . . for legislative
provisions that might not survive the scrutiny of the authorizing
committees ." 277
However, while the House enforces its rules more strictly than
does the Senate, 278 the House Committee on Rules may and often
does waive or suspend rules with respect to appropriations bills.279
When congressional rules are waived, riders may be attached to
acted); 141 CONG. REc. H23, H29 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995). Although riders may be
appended to bills, the report clearly states "it is not the intent of this rule to make in order
any amendments not otherwise in order under the rules. Thus, any amendments to rescind
or reduce direct spending must be germane to the bill as reported or be given special
protection by way of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and adopted by the
House?' 141 CONG. REC. H37.
275. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at 735. The House also has a rule requiring that
amendments be germane to the topic of the bill they propose to affect; however, the Senate
has no germaneness rule of general application. See Bach, supra note 247, at 707.
Moreover, although the Senate does prohibit policy-based amendments to House-passed
appropriations bills, its broad interpretive standards enable members to defend many issues
as germane. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at 735-36.
276. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 361 (1979). See generally SMITH &
DEERING, supra note 250, at 235-36.
277. See SMITH & DEERING, supra note 50, at 183; Neal E. Devins, Regulation of
Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 458, 458-59 (the
"incomplete" appropriations process should not be used to prevent authorizing committees
from applying their expertise).
278. See Bach, supra note 247, at 711.
279. This happened with particular frequency in the 104th Congress. See, e.g., 142
CONG. REc. D629 (daily ed. June 18, 1996) (House Comm. on Rules waives points of
order against legislative provisions in House Bill 3662, 104th Cong. (1996), the general
appropriations bill for the Department of Interior and related agencies for FY 1997); 141
CONG. REc. H4344, 4345 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995) (House approves Rules Comm,
resolution waiving all points of order against House Bill 889, 104th Cong. (1995), a
defense measure that included a moratorium on Endangered Species Act listings). The
House Committee on Rules approved the timber rider by waiving both House Rule XXI,
which prohibits unauthorized legislative provisions in appropriations bills, and House Rule
XVI, the germaneness rule. See H.R. REP. No. 104-78 (1995); 141 CONG. REc. D347(daily ed. Mar. 14, 1995). Waivers are easily obtained when the appropriations chair or
the chair of the authorizing committee desires inclusion of a rider: "the Rules Committee
is a generally dependable ally of the majority-party leadership' Bach, supra note 247, at
705; see also Stewart, supra note 164, at 1015 (noting that appropriations committees have
been centers of power since inception); Axline, supra note 54, at 639 (discussing Senators
Gorton and Hatfield's influence over the adoption of the salvage rider). Moreover, the
House allows "limitation" riders, which restrict or limit the use of funds for any part of
a program addressed in the bill. See Oleszek, supra note 162, at 736. Limitation riders
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appropriations bills and move through the process with minimal
public review and input, and without due consideration of the bills'
implications by the authorizing committees with jurisdiction over
the rider's subject matter.280
Moreover, the hasty process by which riders are appended to
large appropriations bills provides little opportunity for non-mem-
bers of the appropriations committees to read the rider's provi-
sions, much less consider, question, or debate, the wisdom of its
requirements and prohibitions.281
2. Continuing Resolutions Are Particularly Susceptible to Policy
Amendments
The pitfalls of making sweeping policy decisions through the
appropriations process are exacerbated when Congress fails to en-
act one or more of the thirteen regular appropriations bills by the
start of the new fiscal year, and a continuing resolution is required
to provide last minute stopgap funding and maintain government
operations. 2 2 There are no congressional rules to hinder the inclu-
sion of policy matters in a continuing resolution.283 As a result,
continuing resolutions may encourage appropriators "to pursue leg-
inevitably make policy. See id. (citing abortion as a classic example); see also-Devins,
supra note 277, at 456-57.
280. See Allan Freedman, For Sale: Government Assets To Reduce Budget Deficit,
57 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2889, 2890 (1995) (quoting Rep. George Miller, ranking minority
member of the House Natural Resources Committee, expressing disgust at efforts to tack
a rider allowing oil and gas drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge onto the
Balanced Budget Act of 1995).
281. See Devins, supra note 277, at 458 ("Exacerbating this problem [of using the
appropriations process to accomplish substantive ends], appropriations are often acted on
quickly, providing little opportunity for thoughtful deliberation of the issues raised by such
measures:'); see also 141 CONG. Rc. H6637 (daily ed. June 29, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Obey) (sarcastically noting that it might be "kind of useful" to be allowed time to read
the 1995 salvage timber rider before debating it); id. at H6638 (statement of Rep. Defazio)
("we are going to be asked to vote on [compromise language in the salvage timber rider]
within 15 minutes .... This is an ... extraordinary outrage.").
282. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Blame Checks and Balances, WASH. POST, Nov. 15,
1995, at A23 (describing political jockeying to obtain substantive concessions in budget
crises and fiscal "train wrecks" of the 104th Congress in late 1995); Eric Pianin & John
F. Harris, Clinton Signs Measures to Halt Shutdown, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1996, at Al
(reporting that congressional resolutions had been signed that would bring an end to the
three-week government shutdown but leave federal workers virtually ham-strung because
operating funds were not provided for many agencies; congressional resolutions are a
"'goofy' and patchwork approach to restoring government services").
283. See SMITH & DEERING, supra note 250, at 210.
Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 21
islative matters without the consent and cooperation of the affected
authorizing committee 284
The danger is particularly great because of the circumstances
surrounding the passage of continuing resolutions. 285 Especially
when Congress chooses to fund all or a number of the thirteen
annual appropriations bills through a single omnibus resolution, the
sheer size of the document is likely to ensure that only a handful
of appropriations committee members understand the details con-
tained within them.286 In addition, because of their urgency, con-
tinuing resolutions are often virtually veto-proof. 287 Thus neither
fellow members of Congress, or the President, are likely to serve
as a check on continuing resolution riders.
Recent events clearly illustrate the risks of the appropriations
process as it currently operates. 288 During the budgetary "train wreck"
in 1995 and early 1996,289 Senator Robert Byrd concluded that the
284. Id. at 211.
285. See Stewart, supra note 164, at 1029. "Appropriations bills often pass at the
eleventh hour as the federal government's spending authority runs out, and tremendous
pressures, unrelated to a rider's substance, push toward passage." Sher & Hunting, supra
note 165, at 479. For this reason, Senator McCain recently introduced the Government
Shutdown Prevention Act, S. 228, 105th Cong. (1997), which would set Fiscal Year 1998
spending at 98% of FY 1997 levels if appropriations bills are not completed on time. See
143 CONG. REc. S3017, 3018 (daily ed., Apr. 10, 1997).
286. See Stewart, supra note 164, at 1029. Stewart notes that the omnibus continu-
ing resolution for FY 1987 weighed 30 pounds. See id.
287. See, e.g., Statement by President on Signing H.R. 1643 Continuing Resolution,
U.S. NEwsWIRE, Washington, D.C., Jan. 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5618883 [herein-
after Statement by President] (noting the adverse effects of three-week government
shut-down, President Clinton signed two continuing resolutions, although they contained
a provision that "single[d] out poor women by prohibiting the use of District [of Columbia]
funds for providing abortion services" and failed to fund significant activities, such as EPA
enforcement of environmental laws); see also Michael Rappaport, The President's Veto
and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 735, 784 n.198 (1993) (describing President
Hayes' "heroic resistance to tacking" by vetoing appropriations bills that contained riders);
J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and
Kurland, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 437, 476 (1990) (arguing that legislative bundling of unrelated
measures vitiates the veto power).
288. See discussion supra Parts III.B-.C., I.A-.B.; see also NFRC v. Glickman
(NFRC II), 97 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 1996); SAS v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th
Cir. 1990) (substantive legislation through appropriations bills is inappropriate), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
289. During the 104th Congress, the government shut down twice, for a week in
November and again for 21 days in December and January. According to the General
Accounting Office, prior to 1995 there had been nine occasions since 1981 when funding
gaps of one to three days occurred, usually over a weekend. See Statement by Sen. Robert
C. Byrd on Government Shutdown, GOVERNMENT PREss RELEAsES, Nov. 15, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 12677684 [hereinafter Statement by Sen. Byrd]. "Not one of these occasions
approached the cost or the severity, not to mention the gross irresponsibility, of our present
situation." Id. The 1995-96 shutdowns were estimated to have cost the government, and
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cause of the failure to complete congressional action on eight
remaining appropriations bills was "the fact that virtually all of
them contain at least one controversial legislative rider-issues
such as public housing reform, EPA regulatory issues, mining law
reform, California desert protection, National Endowment for the
Arts, prison reform, abortion and rewriting the 1994 Crime Bill 290
Senator Byrd surmised that "the grand strategy of the Republican
majority in Congress is to threaten to shut down the government
and to force a default on our debt in order to coerce the President
"1291
In January, as the second shutdown reached the end of its third
week and as appropriations for several departments and agencies
still had not neared completion, Congress began to pass "mini"
continuing resolutions, funding pet projects one by one, as con-
stituents felt the pinch of suspended government contracts and
closed national parks.292 Finally, in April-seven months after the
start of the fiscal year-a consolidated spending bill was enacted
to fund programs that were still without general appropriations
bills .293
C. Riders Subvert the Integrity of a Republican,
Representational Legislature
Although standard legislative procedures sometimes fail to
achieve informed decisionmaking reflective of the public interest,
that ideal is utterly unattainable when procedural safeguards are
ignored or unavailable.29 4 To include provisions that change or obviate
the taxpayers, about $1 billion. See Dan Morgan & Stephen Barr, When Shutdown Hit
Home Ports, GOP Cutters Trimmed their Sails, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1996, at Al.
290. Statement by Sen. Byrd, supra note 289; see Morgan & Barr, supra note 289,
at Al ("Conservatives have loaded appropriations bills with legislative provisions on
abortion, labor law and environmental regulations that are unacceptable to President
Clinton or Senate Democrats, so the measures are stalled.").
291. Statement by Sen. Byrd, supra note 289.
292. See Morgan & Barr, supra note 289, at Al; Statement of President, supra note
287; Pianin & Harris, supra note 282, at Al.
293. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
294. Professor Rappaport states that the "modem tactic of legislating by massive
Continuing Resolutions . . . makes a travesty of the ideal of a deliberative Congress."
Rappaport, supra note 287, at 743 n.21. Presumably, he would agree, then, that the practice
of tacking substantive policy items to omnibus appropriations bills, which may provide
even less opportunity for debate, would also make a travesty of a democratic legislature.
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public policy and law in an appropriations bill or continuing reso-
lution seriously undermines the integrity of the process and cir-
cumvents the public will as expressed in those pre-existing sub-
stantive laws. Riders erode the very foundation of the democratic
model of bicameral, tripartite government by limiting responsive
representation that can only result from fully informed debate and
decisionmaking: 295
[Riders do not provide the public with] ... an adequate oppor-
tunity to examine the policy path~that is being advanced, much
less members of Congress. This is not in keeping with the
American tradition of representative government: the American
people have a right to know that significant policy changes are
being made and they have a right to know the direction of the
new policy path.296
In effect, the inclusion of riders in the appropriations process
provides a mechanism for Congress to avoid confronting funda-
mental conflicts in public values. Elected officials need not take
controversial positions when they vote on lengthy appropriations
bills that include virtually undetectable riders. The result is that
hard choices are not made, and accountability falls by the way-
side.297 When riders dictate policy in the environmental area, the
results "highlight the disparity between the far-reaching statement
of protection asserted in NEPA and other environmental laws and
the political realities that encouraged Congress to eviscerate the
statutes' substantive impact. 29
295. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 46-47, 89-90 (Harv. Univ.
Press 1980) (arguing that under the basic democratic theory of government, the fundamen-
tal role of Congress is to represent the consensus of the citizens, while the role of the
Constitution is to ensure adequate process so that the voices of the people may be heard).
296. 141 CONG. REc. H9687-88 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Rep. Vento
on the proposed Interior appropriations bill for FY 1996).
297. See Pamela L. Zielske, Recent Case, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 741, 742-43, 756(1996) (noting that Pennsylvania constitution includes a prohibition on substantive riders
and other "pernicious customs" of the legislature in an effort to avoid procedural abuses
and promote governmental honesty and accountability); see also Williams, supra note 268,
at 798 (noting that, in response to perceived legislative abuses, virtually all state consti-
tutions contain procedural limitations that strive to require open and deliberative processes
so that the merits of legislative proposals may be addressed "in an orderly and rational
manner"). For further discussion of approaches to the rider problem at the state level, see
infra note 314, 314.
298. Sher & Hunting, supra note 165, at 476. This is the very reason that implied
repeals or waivers of pre-existing substantive laws are "especially disfavored when the
claimed repeal relies on an appropriations act." NFRC v. Glickman (NFRC II), 97 F.3d
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Not only does the use of appropriations riders curtail full
debate and public involvement, riders typically foreclose judicial
challenge to agency actions as well.299 Appropriations riders that
limit opportunities for judicial review are doubly suspect. Such
riders are especially likely to compromise non-economic resources
by encouraging agencies to "violate statutory requirements with
impunity,"300 thereby fostering-even encouraging-shortsighted-
ness.
The use of riders to exempt specified activities from environ-
mental requirements and to limit judicial review eviscerates a "fun-
damental premise of federal environmental policy"301-that the laws
apply uniformly to agencies across the country, and require rational
decisionmaking that considers the action's broader implications on
the public welfare, guided by substantive standards, informed by
public participation, and enforceable by the judiciary. 0 2 Such riders
"undermin[e] the integrity of the laws and our judicial system,' '30 3
creating a compelling case for a forceful and effective remedy.
VI. THE MANIPULATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE RIDERS NECESSITATES A
CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
Commentators have suggested a variety of remedies to the
problem of Congressional appropriations riders. A president, espe-
1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U. 153, 190 (1978)).
Further, the legislative history of such enactments may provide no reliable interpretive
guidance, because such bills are not subjected to committee review and full floor debate.
See Devins, supra note 277, at 481-82 (noting that, because riders rarely contain clear
policy statements, they often result in interpretive difficulties). But see United States v.
Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 556-57 (1940) (relying heavily on legislative debates to interpret
rider that prohibited previously authorized bonuses for Army re-enlistees).
299. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
300. Bolduan, supra note 59, at 364. Accordingly, "when economic concerns and
environmental law conflict, the law should be reviewed, not circumvented" 135 CONG.
Rac. S12,983 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Biden).
301. See Sher, supra note 4, at 10,470.
302. See id.; 135 CONG. REc. S12,983 (statement of Sen. Biden) (this "disturbing
trend ... continues a wrong-headed and potentially devastating practice of using legisla-
tion approved with no public review to undermine environmental laws that were developed
through a lengthy public process").
303. Sher, supra note 4, at 10,469. "[T]he right to hold government action account-
able before an independent judiciary" is part of "'the- very essence of civil liberty."' Id.
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803)); see Sher & Hunting, supra note
34, at 481-82.
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cially one armed with textual veto authority, 0 4 might be able to
correct or veto abusive bills.305 The courts might, by imposing a
stricter standard of review on agency action permitted or mandated
by a provision in an appropriations rider, reassert the primacy of
legislation resulting from a truly deliberative process. 3 6 The House
and Senate might be persuaded to apply existing rules concerning
riders more strictly,30 7 or to enact super-legislation 308 that would
protect the appropriations process by enforcing germaneness rules.
Finally, the creation or recognition of a constitutional right to a
sustainable environment could prevent encroachment by legislative
riders.309
After considering each of these alternatives, this Article sug-
gests that yet another option would best foster integrity and respon-
siveness in our republican form of government, as well as protect
natural resources and the environment: a process-oriented consti-
tutional amendment precluding the enactment of substantive law
through the appropriations process.310
304. See infra note 314 and accompanying text.
305. See Rappaport, supra note 287, at 784 (arguing that to deter rider-tacking, the
President should make a public pledge to veto appropriations bills that include substantive
provisions).
306. Bolduan, Sher, and Hunting propose stricter standards than regular Adminis-
trative Procedure Act "arbitrary and capricious" review. See Bolduan, supra note 59, at
373-80; Sher & Hunting, supra note 165, at 479-82. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX,
DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971).
307. See Axline, supra note 54, at 613, 638-39. Professor Axline does not suggest
how to accomplish this objective, which is unfortunate considering the serious impediment
presented by the House and Senate's long-standing authority to govern their own internal
procedures with virtually no influence, let alone oversight, by the other two branches of
government or the public. See Bach, supra note 247, at 701-02. Indeed, although the
Constitution says very little about the nuts and bolts of the business of legislating, it
specifically provides that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings" U.S,
CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
308. "Super-legislation" is used here to describe a statutory rule that could only be
waived by a super-majority vote in the Senate or House.
309. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 165, at 482-85 (arguing that a constitutional
right would "insulate environmental values from legislative erosion" and justify heightened
scrutiny of congressional conduct on environmental issues); Rodger Schlickeisen, Protect-
ing Biodiversity for Future Generations: An Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 8
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 181 (1994) (arguing that an amendment is necessary to protect rights of
current and future generations to benefits of natural resources and to prevent legislation
or agency action that would harm ecological systems).
310. This option is presented here in response to the need to curtail hasty public
policy legislation involving environmental issues, particularly riders, such as the 1995
timber rider, which diminish the separation of powers between political branches. How-
ever, an amendment need not be limited to environmental matters; instead, it should apply
to all legislation that makes substantive policy.
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A. Other Proposed Solutions Would Not Sufficiently Restrict the
Use of Appropriations Riders
1. The Line Item Veto Act, Even if it Were Constitutional, Would
Not Prohibit Substantive Riders
The recently enacted Line Item Veto Act allows the President
to excise "(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority;
[or] (2) any item of new direct spending" from a bill or joint
resolution.311 The Act is a "reduction only" veto,312 which grants
the Executive limited authority to reduce specific dollar amounts.
Even members of Congress agree that the Act "will be helpful in
imposing budget discipline ... [and] in preventing unsupportable
spending projects from being added to spending bills without pub-
lic notice, debate, or hearings....,313
Although the line-item veto provides a much needed mecha-
nism to subject pork-barrel projects to the veto pen without jeop-
ardizing an entire budget or appropriations bill, its narrow grant of
authority does not address the problem of substantive legislative
riders.3 14 Further, line-item veto powers, even narrowly tailored
reduction-only veto provisions, may well violate Articles I and HI
by improperly delegating legislative powers to the Executive, thereby
upsetting the balance of powers.315 In fact, a federal district court
311. See Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 2(a), § 1021(a), 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified at
2 U.S.C.A. § 691(a) (1997)).
312. See Antony R. Petrilla, Note, The Role of the Line-Item Veto in the Federal
Balance of Power, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 480-81 (1994).
313. 142 CONG. REc. S4250, S4251 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Dorgan) ("Congress has a bad habit of spending money on projects that we have not
reviewed in committee hearings or permitted in authorization bills .... The bill will help
the President control spending abuses, especially unauthorized projects in appropriations
bills:').
314. Over 40 states allow some form of line-item veto. See Richard Briffault, The
Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMp. L. REv. 1171, 1175 (1993). Some of the state
provisions that do not explicitly limit the veto authority to dollar amounts or spending
items have been interpreted to allow textual redlining, see Petrilla, supra note 312, at n.42,
and accompanying text, but most state courts have refused to give such expansive
interpretation. See Diane-Michele Krasnow, The Imbalance of Power and the Presidential
Veto: A Case for the Item Veto, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583, 597 n.271 (1991) (citing
cases).
315. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1838
(1996) (an expansive line-item veto authority "dramatically fails the test of balance");
Briffault, supra note 314, at 1174 ("By putting asunder what the legislature has put
together [through negotiation and compromise] the item veto results in laws the legislature
never passed" thereby challenging the view that legislation is the domain of the legisla-
1997]
514 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 21
has recently found the Act unconstitutional on such grounds, 316
Thus, any legislative attempt to expand the Line Item Veto Act to
allow the President to make changes (or deletions) in the substance
of bills would be constitutionally suspect.317
Even if courts were to allow the line-item veto to be expanded
in this way, this approach would not solve other problems created
by substantive riders. An executive veto, which of course occurs at
the end of the legislative process, is no substitute for proper inves-
tigation and consideration by the authorizing committee and floor
debate by members of both political parties, nor does it replace
opportunities for public scrutiny and input that are possible during
normal legislative consideration. 31 Finally, like other legislation,
the line-item veto could easily be rescinded in future congressional
sessions.319
2. Stricter Judicial Scrutiny Would Not Be Immune from
Legislative Erosion
A number of commentators have suggested that stricter judi-
cial review of agency actions derived from substantive riders could
ture.). In National Treasury Union v. United States, a federal labor organization alleged
violations of the Article I, § 7 Presentment Clause, which gives the Executive the authority
to veto bills, Article III checks and balances, and Article I, § 5, which gives each house
authority to establish its own procedural rules. See 929 F. Supp. 484, 486 (D.D.C. 1996).
The claims were dismissed for lack of standing. See id. at 490.
316. See Byrd v. Raines, 97-0001-TPJ, 1997 WL 169409 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1997).
In Byrd v. Rains, the court held that the presentment clause of the Article I prevents
Congress from ceding basic legislative authority, such as cancellation or repeal of a
statutory provision, to the President. See id. at *10. The court found the Act's cancellation
provision analagous to the legislative veto issue in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983),
stating that "[j]ust as Congress could not delegate to one of its chambers the power to
veto select provisions of law, it may not assign that authority to the President." Id. at *10
(citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954). The Clinton administration has stated its intent to appeal
the decision to the Supreme Court. See Peter Baker, Clinton Plans Quick Line-Item Veto
Appeal, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1997, at A6.
317. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Line-Item Veto Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REv.
1498, 1501 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 100 n.170 (1994). Thus, there have been many advocates
of establishing a line-item veto by constitutional amendment. See, e.g., Sidak, supra, at
1503-04; Calabresi, supra, at 72 n.119.
318. See Flaherty, supra note 315, at 1838 (arguing that the line-item veto impedes
joint accountability by permitting enactment without approval of different branches
representing different manifestations of the public will).
319. See Sidak, supra note 317, at 1500 (indicating that future congresses could
"repeal, suspend or otherwise circumscribe line-item veto authority conferred . . . by
statute").
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lessen the Congress's ability to use this means of legislating policy.
In fact, the Court has long recognized that heightened scrutiny may
extend to substantive legislation that lacks the opportunity for pub-
lic input and full congressional investigation and debate. In U.S. v.
Carolene Products Co.,320 the case often credited as the origin of
the strict scrutiny test of constitutional review,321 the Supreme Court
found that the challenged law322 did not violate the Fifth Amend-
ment because Congress had a rational basis for its enactment, as
demonstrated by review of reports of committee hearings in which
Congress considered extensive investigations and expert testimony.
At the same time, the Court acknowledged that legislation
affecting commercial transactions could be found unconstitutional
if it is "of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experi-
ence of the legislators. ' 32 3 Arguably, if heightened scrutiny were
applied to environmental riders such as section 2001, and the self-
serving statements of the bills' sponsors were properly discounted,
such riders could be found to exceed Congress's authority under
the Property Clause3 24 or Commerce Clause.3 25 In fact, the courts
have consistently embraced this concept to a limited degree, hold-
ing that appropriations riders, as a "disfavored" mechanism for
legislating, will be interpreted to amend or waive the underlying
authorizing statute only if such an interpretation is clearly in-
tended.326
However, while the need for judicial oversight is compelling,
strict review would not be immune from legislative erosion. The
United States and its agencies have long enjoyed sovereign immu-
nity from lawsuits,327 although Congress chose to waive this immu-
nity in a limited fashion through the enactment of the Administra-
320. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
321. See id. at 152 n.4.
322. The Filled Milk Act, ch. 262, 42 Stat. 1486 (1923) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 61-63 (1994)).
323. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152.
324. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
325. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
326. See, e.g., Seattle Audobon Society v. Robertson, 503 U.S. 429, 440 ("[R]epeals
by implication are especially disfavored in the appropriations context, [although] Congress
nonetheless may amend substantive law in an appropriations statute, as long as it does so
clearly.") (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978)).
327. See Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Adminis-
trative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public Lands Cases, 68 MIcH. L. Rev. 867
(1970).
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tive Procedure Act.328 Even after the passage of the APA, citizen
enforcement was not assumed, leading Congress to create citizen
suit provisions in most major environmental statutes. 329
Finally, these rights to sue, given by statute, may just as easily
be taken away by statute. They may even, as the timber rider cases
make all too clear, be limited or eliminated by rider language that
directs projects to be found compliant, or directs action to be taken
in the agency's "sole discretion"
3. Super-Legislation Requiring Germaneness, While Perhaps a
Step in the Right Direction, May, Be Constitutionally Infirm, as
Well as Subject to Repeal
As previously noted, there is no independent mechanism to
enforce the rules of Congress; members are left to comply volun-
tarily. 30 The unfortunate result of this lack of outside enforcement
is that waivers and exemptions, particularly on environmental is-
sues, easily become the rule, not the exception. To prevent this, an
approach that ensures (or at least allows) external enforcement and
ensure compliance is necessary. One approach would involve the
passage of "super-legislation," which could only be revoked by
more than a simple, majority.331 Such super-legislation could encap-
sulate House and Senate rules barring substantive legislation through
the abbreviated budget process. If a member were to challenge an
appropriations provision on germaneness grounds, a supermajority
would be required to override the objection and pass the rider.332
328. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 239-40 n.ll (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F2d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 1980). Prior to that waiver,
it was very difficult, if not impossible, to subject executive agencies' decisions to judicial
review. In fact, it was not until the Supreme Court handed down Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), that informal agency action was subjected to
rigorous judicial review.
329. See, e.g.,, Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Endangered
Species Act § 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994).
330. See Bach, supra note 247, at 701-02; U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
331. The Senate's rule for terminating filibusters illustrates the difficulty of captur-
ing more than a simple majority vote in Congress. The Senate may not vote on a measure
if any senator seeks recognition to speak on it. In this way, the minority has power to
indefinitely stall legislation, unless at least three-fifths of the senators agree to limit debate
by invoking cloture-a significant obstacle to forcing a vote on any particular bill. See
Bach, supra note 247, at 703 ("[Tlhe danger of filibuster is almost omnipresent.").
Notably, senators may not filibuster appropriations bills. See id.
332. Similarly, members of the 104th Congress proposed to protect the economic
[Vol. 21
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In fact, the Constitution jealously guards the right of majority
rule, requiring supermajorities for only five kinds of measures:
presidential impeachment, expulsion of House or Senate members,
ratification of treaties, overriding a veto, and amending the Consti-
tution. 3 The Framers believed that, although super-legislation might
inhibit hasty and ill-conceived measures, the resulting power in the
hands of the minority generally outweighed the benefits. "[T]he
fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It
would no longer be the majority that would rule .... [A]n inter-
ested minority might take advantage of [supermajority require-
ments] to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general
weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indul-
gences." 334
To give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is
always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a
decision) ... has an effect the reverse of what is expected...
[i]ts real operation is ... to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or
artifices of an insignificant, turbulent or corrupt junto to the
regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority.
If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority,
respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order
that something may be done, must then conform to the views
of the minority .... Hence tedious delays; continual negotia-
tions and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public
good.335
interests of constituents by requiring a supermajority to pass tax increases. See 142 CoNG.
REC. H3256 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996). Interestingly, proponents believed that economic
issues justified a mechanism to "temper simple majoritarianism," id. at H3259 (statement
of Rep. Solomon) (arguing that tax increases are "at least as significant as ratification of
a treaty"), so that Congress would either cut spending or look to economic stimulants to
raise revenues instead of the peoples' pocketbooks. See id. (citing columnist George Will).
333. Opponents to the tax proposal, discussed in note 332 supra, argued that "the
Founding Fathers were willing to accept the fact that Congresses in the future might use
poor judgment at times and pass harmful laws by a majority vote-but they believed so
deeply in the principle of majority rule, that they placed that principle above whatever
personal concerns they had that the majority at times would act in a manner contrary to
their own feelings:' Id. at H3260.
334. THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (cited in 142
CONG. REc. H3256, H3260 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996)).
335. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton); see 142 CONG. REc. H3260
(statement of Rep. Beilenson) (arguing that the Framers' reluctance to include superma-
jority provisions in the Constitution "was largely due to the ineffectiveness of the Articles
of Confederation which .... required a supermajority for both taxing and spending, and
the fact that it was so difficult to pay off [Revolutionary War] debts . . . and to pay for
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Arguably, requiring supermajorities to enact waivers of exist-
ing law through appropriations riders does not present the same
concerns. Such legislation would simply make it more difficult to
pass such waivers. The status quo, which, while imperfect, does
provide environmental and procedural safeguards, would likely be
preserved; the "pertinacious minority" would be discouraged from
making "contemptible compromises" of the public interest.
Although such legislation may be a workable solution, or at
least a step in the right direction, it does not rest easily within the
existing constitutional framework, and would seem to directly con-
tradict Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution.336 Indeed, legislation
that imposes procedural requirements on the internal workings of
Congress may be subject to constitutional challenge. 337 Moreover,
like the line-item veto, a legislatively enacted provision of this kind
could too easily be repealed by later legislation.
B. A Constitutional Amendment Is Warranted
1. The Erosion of Legislative Safeguards Justifies Amendment
Constitutional amendments Should not be proposed lightly.
Indeed, the process of amending the Constitution338 is "so cumber-
some that it can serve as a safety valve only under the most
extreme conditions. '339 Amendment is justified, however, when the
political process is systemically malfunctioning, as it has been in
recent years with the advent of sweeping changes in substantive
law through appropriations riders.
the regular national expenditures thereafter . ... For that reason, the Philadelphia Con-
vention chose to reject proposals to impose supermajorities in legislative fields of even
special sensitivity and concern, reserving them for the five specific and special areas").
336. "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings" U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 5, cl. 2; see also Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Note, Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?,
96 YALE L.J. 838, 855 (1987) (arguing that a "house's power to exercise its ancillary
functions cannot be abridged by a statute").
337. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 929 F. Supp. 484(D.D.C. 1996) (challenging constitutionality of line-item veto).
338. See U.S. CONsT. art. V.
339. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013, 1057 (1984) (referring to the difficulty of using constitutional amend-
ments to reverse Supreme Court decisions); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional
Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDozo L. REv.
691, 694 (1996) (arguing that the Constitution should be amended "only reluctantly and
as a last resort").
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One might argue that the examples of failed rider attempts
discussed above provide evidence that our current constitutional
regime is functioning properly.340 After all, the riders incorporated
into the 1996 Interior Appropriations Bill,341 the 1996 Consolidated
Rescissions and Appropriations Act,342 and the Balanced Budget
Act of 1995343 either failed in Congress or were vetoed. However,
the persistence demonstrated by the President and minority party
during the highly unusual standoff on the 1996 budget is unlikely
to recur under more typical circumstances. 344 On balance, the in-
creasing manipulation of the appropriations process to shift the
balance of powers and all but preclude the President's veto power,
to short-cut full consideration by lawmakers, and to sidestep public
participation in legislative decisionmaking has created a crisis that
may require constitutional action. Legislative proposals and other
non-constitutional proposals to limit the abuse of the appropria-
tions process simply do not go far enough to safeguard the public
interest and are too easily subverted by powerful appropriations
committees or future congresses.
The Federalist Papers provide ample evidence that the Framers
of the Constitution believed that under certain conditions, a change
in preexisting constitutional principles may be warranted. 45 In-
deed, amendments are in order when the Framers' objectives "have
been attenuated by political developments" 346 An amendment to
340. See discussion supra Part N.B.
341. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
342. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
343. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
344. See discussion supra Part IV.A. For example, the public perception that the
Republican Congress was to blame for the budgetary "train wreck" gave the Clinton
administration an unusual freedom to exercise the veto power. This perception itself
resulted from the unique, and in retrospect ill-advised, efforts of the Republicans to turn
a narrow mandate into a "revolution."
345. See THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 261 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961);
Ackerman, supra note 339, at 1021-22; Sidak, supra note 317, at 1504-05. "[L]aws and
institutions go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind .... With the change
of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times." 142 CONG.
REc. H3256 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996) (statement of Rep. Mcinnis, quoting Thomas
Jefferson). "Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide for
them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust chance and violence." Id.
(quoting Constitutional Convention statement of Colonel Mason).
346. 142 CONG. REc. at H3256, H3259 (statement of Rep. Solomon, quoting George
Will); see Sullivan, supra note 339, at 703 (arguing that although there is a strong
presumption against amending the Constitution, amendment may be justified "when
changes consistent with its broad purposes are unlikely to be implemented by ordinary
legislative means").
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renew the integrity of congressional deliberation and legislative
accountability would not be a radical innovation; instead it should
be viewed as an attempt to revitalize the original values of the
Constitution. 47
Heightened constitutional protection for citizen participation
in the legislative process and for congressional accountability is
justified under this theory for several reasons. First, although it has
become common practice in modem times, "tacking policy items
onto budgetary legislation would have been viewed with extreme
distaste" by the Framers. 48 Excessive rider-tacking has seriously
eroded the integrity of the tripartite, republican democracy estab-
lished by the Framers, who envisioned the legislature not only as
a representational body, but also as a deliberative body-not only
reflective of trends in public opinion but also mindful of the long-
term public good.349
The use of riders to direct environmental policy highlights the
need for amendment because powerful forces working against en-
vironmental stewardship cannot be checked without constitutional
347. See 142 CONG. RFc. H3256, H3258-59 (statement of Rep. Solomon in support
of an amendment to require a supermajority to enact tax increases). Machiavelli predicted
that "all human Constitutions are subject to Corruption and must perish, unless they are
timely renewed by reducing them to their first Principles." GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 34 (1969) (cited in Krasnow, supra note 314, at
583).
348. Marcus, supra note 282, at A23 (citing Professor Michael McConnell, Univer-
sity of Chicago, and Professor Dougas Kmiec, University of Notre Dame); see also
LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 460 ("[T]he Framers could not possibly have envisioned the
position appropriations riders occupy today."); Krasnow, supra note 314, at 607 (arguing
that the Framers, though aware of the rider-tacking procedure, did not foresee the extent
to which it has now evolved); Sidak & Smith, supra note 287, at 471 (arguing that although
some bill-bundling was probably anticipated, in all likelihood the Framers "did not
contemplate legislative bundling on the scale that Congress indulges in today"; the first
appropriations bill contained only four items of expenditures and no substantive riders);
Thomas Schroeder, Note, Original Understanding and Veto Power: Are the Framers Safe
While Congress is in Session?, 7 J.L. & POL. 757 (1991). Professor Rappaport, however,
argues that the Framers were familiar with the practice of rider-tacking but thought that
the Executive and the Senate held sufficient powers to prevent most instances of abuse.
See Rappaport, supra note 287, at 740, 764-66; see also Wolfson, supra note 336, at
840-44 (arguing that, based on British and colonial experience, the Framers realized that
the Executive could only veto appropriations bills, even those with non-germane riders,
with great difficulty); Marcus, supra note 282, at A23 (noting that, at least as of the first
day of the past year's lengthy and unprecedented government shutdowns, Professor
Laurence Tribe believed that rider-spawned gridlock was simply a sign of checks and
balances at work; forcing the President's hand by including irrelevant matters in bills
"would not have struck [the Framers] as a flaw in the constitutional design").
349. See Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., The Framer's Understanding of Constitutional
Deliberations in Congress, 21 GA. L. REv. 217, 235 (1986); discussion supra Part II.C.
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protection. The short-term monetary and political gain that attends
the exploitation of natural resources is compelling.35 0 But such
instant gratification comes at the expense of the long-term health
of the ecosystem,351 which, like future generations who will be
most affected by depletion of public resources, cannot speak for
itself, nor can it wield influence through political favors.5 2
2. Riders that Upset Constitutional Checks and Balances
Underscore the Need for an Amendment
The Appropriations Clause353 reflects the Framers' ideal that
the "arbitrariness of government action" be restrained by a require-
ment that public spending be subjected to the rule of law.354 The
Clause also reflects the desire to avoid concentrations of political
power by dividing functions between governmental entities.35 5 Ap-
propriations riders often fly in the face of the Executive's consti-
tutional responsibilities to veto objectionable laws and to enforce
laws that are enacted.35 6 Further, riders that direct executive action
350. See GORE, supra note 39, at 275 (discussing "competing imperatives" that
create incentives to maximize short-term profit and ignore long-term needs, now-Vice
President Gore noted that our society is marked by a dysfunctional way of thinking-a
"ravenous, insatiable consumption, its dogma, and the mechanisms by which ever more
resources are obtained."); Plater, supra note 45, at 734 ("Environmental law, reflecting a
paradigm shift in how we perceive the world, has emerged over the past three decades as one
of the primary realms in which society attempts to insert short and long-term public civic
values into practical economic affairs. This role inevitably makes environmental law a
political battlefield?'); see also Schlickeisen, supra note 309, at 197-201, 209 (arguing
that an environmental right is necessary to ensure posterity of future generations because
statutory law will not provide adequate protections in the face of overwhelming incentives to
maximize short-term gain); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the
Right to Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 117-20 (1991) (arguing that international
safeguards should be imposed on domestic decisionmaking, given the high short-term costs
resulting from environmental protection and the resulting political disfavor).
351. See Axline, supra note 54, at 637 ("The sponsors of the salvage logging rider
are willing to sacrifice entire species if necessary to preserve, even for a short time, a
limited number of jobs at mills that are subsidized by federal timber?').
352. See GORE, supra note 39, at 275. The use of riders to affect environmental
affairs dissolves intergenerational equity, providing an especially compelling justification
for constitutional amendment. See Sidak, supra note 317, at 1499, 1505.
353. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
354. See J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1162, 1167. Requiring a showing of legal authority to draw funds "ensures that the public
will have notice of spending decisions." Id.
355. See LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 458-59 ("Perhaps more perfectly than any
other provision in the Constitution, the Appropriations Clause embodies the notion of
separation of powers?').
356. See LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 472-73; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, art. II.
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contrary to final judgments entered by the courts suffer an addi-
tional defect that justifies constitutional amendment: they upset the
checks and balances provided by Article IXI.117 Appropriations rid-
ers frequently venture into these forbidden territories.358
The United States Constitution is distinguished from other,
less durable democratic frameworks because it separates govern-
mental power into three branches, 35 9 and provides for judicial re-
view to uphold the integrity of this structure against the pressures
of normal politics.360 No one branch of the federal government is
to exercise the functions of another branch;361 Congress "cannot be
judge, jury and executioner under our Constitution 3 62
The separation of powers principle "operates as a complex
machine which encourages each official to question the extent to
which other constitutional officials are successfully representing
the People's true political wishes. '363 The three branches of gov-
ernment are designed to "check each other's defects, and thereby
yield a whole more 'representative' than any of its constituent
parts. 364 Legislation that blurs the distinction between the branches,
as riders often do, is particularly offensive because it undermines
those safeguards. 365
357. See LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 464-65, 475.
358. See id. at 474.
359. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III. "The genius of the Constitution is we have three
branches of the Federal Government [legislative, executive, and judicial]" 141 CONG. REC.
S13,814, S13,828 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). See INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
360. "Given the danger that normal government will be captured by partisans of
narrow special interests' the Framers "consolidate[d] the Revolutionary achievements of
the American people through the institution of judicial review." Ackerman, supra note 339,
at 1029-30 (discussing THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
361. See Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02
(1928); THE FEDERALIST, No. 48 (James Madison) ("[N]one of [the branches] ought to
possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration
of their respective powers.").
362. 141 CONG. REc. S13,828 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Bumpers, questioning constitutionality of congressional efforts to undermine the decisions
of Department of Agriculture Undersecretary James Lyons by zeroing out Lyons' salary
in FY 1996 appropriations bill).
363. Ackerman, supra note 339, at 1028; see id. at 1067.
364. Id. at 1028 n.35.
365. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 442-43 & n.5
(1977) (noting that, while the three brances are not expected to operate in complete
isolation from one another, "'where the whole power of one department is exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constituion [ ] are subverted,"' (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
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a. Interference with the Judiciary
Laws that retroactively command the courts to open final judg-
ments, or that direct the outcome of pending litigation, offend the
separation of powers doctrine by invading the judicial function.366
In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the Supreme Court invalidated
legislation that directed that "dismissed causes of action ... shall
be reinstated. '367 If implemented, the effect of the legislation would
have been to breathe new life into cases dismissed with prejudice
under the law in effect at the time of the dismissal. The Court
found the law unconstitutional, because once a court issues a final
judgment in a case, "a judicial decision becomes the last word of
the judicial department with regard to a particular case or contro-
versy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that
the law applicable to that very case was something other than what
the courts said it was."'368
The 1995 timber rider directed a result that is equally trou-
bling-it retroactively revived executive actions that were finally
and conclusively found to have violated the law.3 69 Further, it de-
feated judicial mandates requiring that the objectionable action be
325-26 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961)); thus, the separation of powers inquiry turns
on the extent to which the exercise of power by one branch prevents another from
"accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions"); cf THE FEDERALIST No. 28
(Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the need to maintain distinct separation of powers
between the federal and state governments to facilitate mass mobilization when necessary
for the common good, such as the mobilization that resulted in the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution itself); THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison)
(making the same point).
366. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1451 (1995); Alaska Wilderness
Recreation & Tourism Ass'n v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 723 (9th Cir 1995); see also Bill Miller,
Congress Votes to Let Morgan, Daughter Return: Rep. Wolf's Intervention Clears Way for
D.C. Surgeon Who Fled U.S. Over Custody Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al, A15
(arguing that this rider, which directed results contrary to a judicial order, was "a direct
assault on the independence of the judiciary" and an unprecedented and "frightening
example of congressional excess") (citing Representative Sensenbrenner and Professor
Jonathon Turley, George Washington University National Law Center).
367. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1451 (striking as unconstitutional a limitations provision
of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78aa-1 (1994)).
368. Id. at 1457; see Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 411, 413 (1792) (revision of Article
III judgments is "radically inconsistent" with independence of the judicial power vested
in the courts); THE FEDERALIST No. 81 at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961)
("A legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made,
in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases.").
369. See Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001(b),(d),(k), 109 Stat. 194 (1996); Plaut, 115 S.
Ct. 1451; U.S. v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
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permanently enjoined, 370 and prevented the Executive from imple-
menting final court orders, as required by Article II.371
Other environmental riders have blurred the lines between po-
litical branches, but, unlike the 1995 timber rider, have not bla-
tantly dismantled final judgments without providing new standards
or circumstances. The courts have been reluctant to invalidate such
riders on separation of powers grounds.372 In fact, the Supreme
Court rejected an Article I challenge to the Hatfield/Adams rider3 73
in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society.374 That rider was drafted
in response to litigation pending at that time, including two cases
specifically mentioned in the statute.375 The Ninth Circuit held that
it directed the outcome of pending litigation, and therefore violated
Article 111.376 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that, even
though the rider was obviously intended to resolve the two named
cases, it "compelled changes" in the law by specifying new envi-
ronmental requirements applicable to the underlying lawsuits, but
did not direct specific findings or results under old law.3 77
Unlike the Hatfield/Adams rider at issue in Robertson, the
1995 timber rider affected not only pending cases, but final judg-
ments and permanent injunctions as well, overstepping the author-
370. See Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992); see
also Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd sub
nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996).
371. See Devins, supra note 277, at 475-76; see also discussion infra Part VI.B.2.b.
372. Courts are required to "adopt a constitutional reading when such an interpre-
tation is reasonable," but interpretations given to riders are sometimes more strained than
reasonable. See Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 554, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933)); id. at 558
(Noonan, J., concurring); see also Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman (NFRC
II), 97 F.3d 1161 (1996). Perhaps courts are reluctant to strike appropriations legislation
on constitutional grounds because of the short duration of these bills, see, e.g., Pub. L.
No. 104-19, § 2001(a)(2) (defining the "emergency period" as ending September 30, 1997)
and § 2001(j) (providing that the authority provided by subsections (b) and (d) shall expire
on December 31, 1996), consistent with the premise that constitutional issues should not
be reached if a case can be resolved on other grounds. However, constitutional violations,
even those that last for only a moment, should not be condoned. See Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (even momentary violations of first amendment freedoms constitute
"irreparable injury").
373. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-121,-§ 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989).
374. 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
375. See id. at 431.
376. Se Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (9th Cir.
1990).
377. See 503 U.S. 429, 437-39 (1992); Apache Survival Coalition v. United States,
21 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that Congress did not exceed its legislative authority
because it replaced laws underlying pending litigation with new requirements).
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ity that has been granted to the judicial branch. 37 Further, unlike
the Hatfield/Adams rider, the 1995 rider provided no new environ-
mental safeguards in lieu of existing laws.379 Thus, it upsets the
separation of powers because it does not simply prescribe rules
governing future conduct but, instead directs specific results by
reference to past actions taken by executive agencies, without chang-
ing the underlying laws.380
378. Article I gives the judiciary the "'province and duty... to say what the law
is' in particular cases and controversies." Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1451,
1453 (1995) (citing Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). It
therefore gives federal courts "the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them"
by rendering dispositive judgments reviewable only by superior courts in the judicial
heirarchy. Id. However, some courts have implied that a distinction could be made, for the
purposes of Article III analysis, based on whether the final judgment involved money
damages or injunctive relief, inferring that laws that affect injunctions may be less
objectionable. In Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 1996),
the court refused to interpret a rider governing the Mount Graham telescope project as
"undoing past judgments' and instead found that it could be read to merely alter the
prospective effect of past injunctions. It is true that, unlike awards for damages, "altered
circumstances sometimes make alterations in an injunction inevitable," id. at 559 (Noonan,
J., concurring); it is also true that Congress itself may effectuate changed circumstances,
see id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421 (1855) (in
which Congress directed that a bridge, previously enjoined as a nuisance and obstruction
to navigation, was a necessary route for the mails)). However, when Congress deprives an
injunction of its effect by directing a result contrary to a court's final order without
changing the underlying circumstances or creating new legal rights, that congressional
mandate is as offensive to separation of powers principles as is interference with a
monetary judgment. Nothing in Supreme Court precedent indicates otherwise. See Plaut,
115 S. Ct. at 1455-56 (citing cases, and noting that President Lincoln refused to interfere
with the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (in which the Court held
that an African man who had been born a slave was not a citizen and therefore could not
bring suit in federal court to establish his freedom or remedy an assault by his former
owner), due to separation of powers concerns, believing that "the evil effect following it,
being limited to that particular case . . . can better be borne than could the evils" of
interference by other political branches); Alaska Wilderness Recreation Ass'n v. Morrison,
67 F.3d 723, 733 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to vacate order enjoining timber harvest for
NEPA violations in spite of sufficiency language in salvage timber rider, Pub. L. 104-19,
§ 503 (1995). Thus, the established principle that courts retain equitable powers to modify
their own injunctive orders to ensure that such orders are not "turned through changing
circumstances into an instruments of wrong" System Fed'n v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642,
647-651 (1961), does not necessarily extend to legislation having retroactive application.
Cf Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (indicating that a rider's
antibusing restriction would be unconstitutional under equal protection principles if it
deprived injunctive remedy of its effectiveness).
379, See Robertson, 503 U.S. at 437-39. Further, while the Court in Systems
Federation, 364 U.S. at 651, found judicial modifications to be warranted because changes
in the law had brought the previous order's terms into direct conflict with statutory
objectives, such was not the case with the timber rider. Previously entered injunctions
affected by the rider were not rendered inequitable or contrary to objectives set forth in
extant environmental law.
380. See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1456-57; Robertson, 503 U.S. at 437-38; see also
Alaska Wilderness Recreation and Tourism Ass'n v. Morrison, 67 .3d 723, 733 (1995)
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b. Interference with the Executive Function
In addition, appropriations riders frequently evade checks and
balances by undermining the executive powers granted by Articles
I and 11 of the Constitution. The 1995 timber rider, like other riders
that require executive action notwithstanding other existing laws,
blatantly offends Article II of the Constitution: the President "shall
take care that the laws be faithfully executed. ' 381 The timber rider
trespassed into the prerogatives of the executive branch by forcing
sales that do not comply with the Northwest Forest Plan-a Plan
that was strongly supported by the President and had been given
judicial blessing as satisfying existing environmental laws382-- to be
released. 38 3 In doing so, the rider significantly eroded the division
between the executive and legislative branches, raising both con-
stitutional and prudential concerns.3 4 To allow Congress to direct
the implementation of pre-existing substantive laws through appro-
priations riders contravenes Article H, and would "subvert the en-
tire notion of separation of powers. The concept of the rule of law
requires those who enact legislation to refrain from executing it.
Only then is the risk of a tyrannical legislature averted."385
(holding that a rider that provided that an EIS was deemed sufficient did not override the
judicial decision that, in fact, the EIS did not satisfy NEPA; rider did not purport to change
the underlying law, nor did it offer any new statutory standards). However, in Northwest
Forest Resource Council v. Glickman (NFRC II), 97 F.3d 1161 (1996), the court summarily
rejected the argument that section 2001(k)(1) violates separation of powers, citing Robert-
son, without further analysis.
381. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
382. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
aff'd sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996).
383. See Bradley Declaration, supra note 131, at 2-3 (discussing action on BLM
sales required to be released under section 2001(k)); Williams Declaration, supra note 132,
at 3 (discussing Forest Service sales that had been enjoined and suspended). The Northwest
Forest Plan itself was crafted in response to a number of previous injunctions; it reserved
sensitive areas from harvest to avoid running afoul of those court orders, and to comply
with the ESA, NFMA, and other environmental laws. See discussion supra Part III.A.
Many of the sales that must be released under section 2001(k) are located within the Plan's
reserves. See Williams Declaration, supra, at 3-4 and Table I.
384. "[O]nce Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation
ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly-by
passing new legislation!' Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986) (citing INS v,
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983)). In Bowsher, the Court found a provision of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, Pub. L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985), which gave Congress
the power to remove the Comptroller General, an officer charged with Executive duties,
to be unconstitutional. See 478 U.S. at 733-34.
385. LeBoeuf, supra note 163, at 473; see Archie Parnell, Congressional Interfer-
ence in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1379 (1980); cf.
Devins, supra note 277, at 458-59. While noting that "riders that prohibit the Executive
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Appropriations riders, by posing the specter of government
shutdown, also undermine the President's authority to veto objec-
tionable legislation, in contravention of Article 1.386 The Present-
ment Clause, a mechanism to protect against "ill-conceived legis-
lation ' 387 was included to ensure that the President, the representative
of national interests, has a voice in the legislative process, which
would otherwise reflect only the more parochial interests of mem-
bers of Congress.388
However, the modem-day budget process has skewed the balance
by shifting a significant amount of control from the President to
Congress. 389 The use of omnibus appropriations bills with non-ger-
mane riders has "made a mockery of the President's ability to exercise
the veto power" 390 and "corrupted the delicate structure of shared
powers."391 This fundamental shift has created a constitutional crisis. 392
In the absence of judicial invalidation of the timber rider and
similar riders, constitutional amendment is warranted so that Con-
gress is not again tempted to "ride" over the functions of the other
two branches. The crisis created by the expansive use of appropria-
tions riders to contravene separation of powers principles justifies
a reaction of constitutional dimension.393
from launching regulatory initiatives-without altering the underlying authorizations stat-
ute-unduly limit the Executive's policymaking responsibilities," Devins urges not an end
to the practice, but merely that Congress be "more sensitive to the implications of
appropriations-based oversight." Id. at 500.
386. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Sidak & Smith, supra note 287, at 475-76
(arguing that rider-tacking vitiates the presentment clause).
387. Krasnow, supra note 314, at 613; see Sidak & Smith, supra note 287, at 446
(indicating that the veto power was expected to "prevent the enactment of harmful laws").
388. See Petrilla, supra note 312, at 471. The Framers intended to "protect the
President from legislative usurpation by empowering him with an institutional weapon to
wield in the legislative process." Krasnow, supra note }6ti f*, at 595.
389. Krasnow, supra note 314, at 586, 601; Petrilla, supra note 312, at 471.
390. Krasnow, supra note 314, at 584. Not only does the attachment of riders onto
appropriations bills have a chilling effect by placing a high political price tag on the use
of the veto, vetoes of budgetary legislation are far more likely to be overridden than other
vetoes. See Petrilla, supra note 312, at 477, 479 (noting that the Congress has overriden
budgetary vetoes approximately 35% of the time, while overriding regular (non-budgetary)
legislation only about 7% of the time).
391. See Krasnow, supra note 314, at 613.
392. See id. at 601, 607 (arguing that the congressional encroachment on the veto
power is a crisis); Sidak & Smith, supra note 287, at 476 (arguing that art. I, § 7, cl. 3
(the residual presentment clause, extending the executive veto to congressional orders and
resolutions) evinces the Framers' desire to prevent Congress from devising creative ways
to avoid the presentment requirement; and arguing that bill-bundling does not seem any
less offensive than labeling a bill a resolution).
393. Interbranch struggles such as those experienced in recent years over the fate
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C. A Constitutional Amendment Should Be Process-Oriented
1. A Substantive Environmental Right Does Not Fit Well within
the Existing Constitutional Framework, Nor Would it Be Immune
to Erosion by Rider
In spite of the lofty policy statement included in the nation's
preeminent environmental law, NEPA-"each person should enjoy
a healthful environment" 39 4-- there is no enforceable right to envi-
ronment or sustainable natural resources. In response, a number of
commentators have argued for the creation, by amendment or ju-
dicial implication, of a constitutional right of this kind.395 However,
the creation of a new substantive right through constitutional amend-
ment finds little support in existing federal or international law. In
addition, proposals to discover or create an environmental right
might not dissuade Congress from utilizing the appropriations process
to effectuate changes in the law. 396
of the environment "signal the existence of a profound constitutional debate," Ackerman,
supra note 339, at 1069, and further justify radical transformation. A constitutional
amendment that effectuates resolution of the "sustained period of extraordinary institu-
tional conflict," id. at 1053, inflicted on the nation and its public lands is a legitimate
reaction. See id. at 1022-23, 1029 (arguing that public mobilization to effectuate funda-
mental change occurs "during rare periods of heightened political consciousness" that
results in a "collective effort to renew and redefine the public good"); see also Plaut v,
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1453-54 (1995) (noting that pre-revolutionary
assemblies' interference with court judgments was one of the concerns that led to
Philadelphia Convention to decide to develop a constitution).
394. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1994).
395. See, e.g., Sher & Hunting, supra note 165; Schlickeisen, supra note 309. For
example, a right to environment might be implied as an essential value of a modern
society: fully informed decisionmaking based upon free choice; recognition of the intrinsic
value of each individual member of society; and patrimonial duties toward future genera-
tions not to limit their freedom of choice and self-destination. See Joseph L. Sax, The
Search for Environmental Rights, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 93, 96 (1990). Environ-
mental interest groups have also argued that the right to a healthy environment is an
individual right protected by the equal protection clause. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV;
Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1421-23, 1438 (9th Cir. 1989). Although the court
acknowledged that the importance of a healthy environment has been found to create
legally cognizable interests, see id. at 1430 n.21 (citing U.S. v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Procedures ("SCRAP"), 412 U.S. 669 (1973)), it did not find it necessary to
resolve the issue. See Stop H-3 Ass'n, 870 F.2d at 1430-32.
396. For example, freedom of reproductive choice, which is not an explicit right but
has been found in the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, see Roe v. Wade, 110 U.S. 113(1973), has come under attack repeatedly in proposed legislative riders. See, e.g., 142
CONG. REC. H1942, H1946 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (discussing abortion rider contained
in earlier version of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of
1996, enacted as Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)).
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Proposals to tack on new constitutional provisions that reflect
the current social values of the time are inherently problematic.
Arguably, "preserving fundamental values is not an appropriate
constitutional task. ' 397 The Constitution is "intended to regulate the
general political interests of the nation, ' 398 rather than to detail
particular rights. We should, then, resist "the temptation to clutter
up [the Constitution] with ... amendments relating to substantive
matters."399
It is most telling that the few attempts the Framers made to
elevate substantive values of the time by designating them for special
protection in the Constitution "have been ill-fated, normally result-
ing in repeal, either officially or by interpretive pretense. ' 400 For
example, slavery, which was protected in the original document, 40'
was outlawed, after much bloodshed, by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.402 Another notable amendment that attempted to encapsulate
a "fundamental" value was the eighteenth-temperance-which was
repealed fourteen years later by the Twenty-First Amendment.
40 3
Similarly, the 1994 Republican Revolution brought a wave of
"amendment fervor,"404 but recent efforts to amend the constitution
397. ELY, supra note 295, at 88.
398. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cook ed., 1961).
399. Lon Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEG. EDUC. 457,
463-64 (1954); see also Sullivan, supra note 339, at 696 (arguing that "[a]mendments
politicize a constitution to the extent that they embed in it a controversial substantive
choice").
400. ELY, supra note 295, at 88. Even the First Amendment's guarantee to free
speech and association is directed toward ensuring that political processes work. See id.
at 93-94. With respect to the religion clauses of the First Amendment, Ely argues that the
establishment clause serves, at least in part, a separation of powers function, not incon-
sistent with the other procedural protections of the Constitution. See id. at 94. The free
exercise clause serves an equal protection-like function that safeguards minority religions
and requires decisionmakers to take the interests of all those their decisions affect into
account; therefore, its inclusion in the Bill of Rights is also "entirely appropriate to a
constitution." Id. at 100. Other substantive provisions, e.g., rights to bear arms and to enter
into contracts, are, arguably, historic anomalies that have been effectively repealed by
judicial construction. See id. at 100-01.
401. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
402. See id. at amend. Xm1I.
403. See id. at amends. XVIII, XXI; Sullivan, supra note 339, at 696 (noting that
"the only modem amendment to enact a social policy .... [Prohibition] is also the only
modem amendment to have been repealed").
404. Michael Doyle, Growing Drive to Amend the Constitution: Congress Turns
Increasingly to this 'Last Step,' SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 15, 1996, at A3; see Sullivan,
supra note 339, at 691, 693 (noting that the 104th Congress has considered more
amendment proposals than at any other time in recent memory: "the current proliferation
of proposed constitutional amendments is striking"). Senator Bumpers recently com-
plained, "Sometimes there are so many changes proposed around here on the Constitution
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to encapsulate moral values, including environmental rights,405 have
failed. Some of the weightiest social issues of our time have been
the subject of proposed amendments, but none has attained passage
by two-thirds of Congress, as required by Article V, much less
ratification by the states: 4 6 equal rights based on gender; 407 bal-
anced budget;408 flag desecration;409 abortion;410 and school prayer.4 1
Political expediency has frequently been the motivation behind
these amendment proposals-many are popular, but largely uncon-
sidered, reactions to issues that happen to be in vogue at the
you would think it was just a rough draft, and that we were charged with the responsibility
of finishing it:' 141 CONG. REc. S13,814, S13,828 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1995).
405. Rep. Morris Udall proposed at least one environmental amendment, and several
others have also been proposed, but none has received serious consideration. See Four
Plans to Add a Nature Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, EARTH ISLAND J., at 11 (1990),
Most recently, a coalition of 37 state legislators announced that they would propose a
constitutional amendment to guarantee the right to a clean and healthy environment to all
present and future generations. See Conservationists Hail Call for Environmental Amend-
ment to U.S. Constitution, U.S. Newswire, Sept. 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12123062.
406. Article V requires ratification by the legislatures of three fourths of the states.
See U.S. CONsT. art. V. An alternative procedure calls for a convention for proposing
amendments on applications of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, see id., but this
provision has never been used. See H.R. REm. 104-3 (1995) (Judiciary Committee report
recommending passage of the Balanced Budget Amendment).
407. Senator Kennedy has consistently proposed that the Judiciary Committee report
an Equal Rights Amendment. See S.J. Res. 40, 103d Cong. (1993), S. REP. 104-343, at 79
(1996); S.J. Res. 3, 102d Cong. (1991), S. REP. 103-30, at 78 (1993); S.J. Res. 1, 101st
Cong. (1989), S. REP. 102-17, at 69 (1991).
408. The Balanced Budget Amendment has been a special favorite of the Republican
majority in the 104th and 105th Congresses, and is one of the seven constitutional
amendment proposals of the party platform. See Jonathan Alter, The Passion Gap,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 1996, at 49 (reporting that others include the imposition of
congressional term limits, protection for school prayer and victims' rights, and prohibitions
on flag burning, abortion, and citizenship for illegal aliens). Although recommended to the
House and Senate by their respective judiciary committees, it has not achieved passage.
See H.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995), H.R. REP. 104-3 (1995); S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong.
(1995), S. RaP. 104-5 (1995); Eric Pianin & Helen Dewar, Budget Amendment Barely
Loses in Senate, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1997, at Al. Similarly, in the 103d Congress, a
balanced budget amendment, S.J. Res. 41 (1993), was reported favorably by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, but overwhelmingly defeated on the floor. See S. RaEP. 104-343 at
79.
409. An amendment to prohibit desecration of the American flag has been proposed
several times in both houses, and the House Judiciary Committee recommended its passage
in the 104th Congress. See H.J. Res. 79, 104th Cong. (1995), H. REP. 104-151 (1995).
Three committee members dissented, objecting to the elevation of the flag "over other
cherished symbols" by embedding the proposal into the Constitution. See id. at 15.
410. See S.J. Res. 37, 103d Cong., S. REP. 103-30, at 78 (1993); S.J. Res. 3, 101st
Cong. (1989), S. REP. 102-17, at 69 (1991).
411. An amendment allowing school prayer has been proposed numerous times in
recent years, but has not been recommended for passage. See S.J. Res. 9, 103d Cong.
(1993), S. REP. 104-343, at 79 (1996); S.J. Res. 15, 103d Cong. (1993), S. Rm'. 103-30,
at 78 (1993); S.J. Res. 144, 101st Cong. (1989), S. RaP. 17, 102d Cong. at 69 (1991).
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moment. For example, a proposal to amend the Constitution to
require a supermajority to pass tax increases, which came up for
consideration on the House floor on April 15, 1996, was labelled
by some as "showboating pure and simple," "a legislative fiasco'
412
and a "public-relations stunt. '413 Similarly, one of the most recent
proposals, the Victims' Rights Amendment, was politically attrac-
tive during the 1996 election year, and drew considerable support
from both parties. 414 The proposal seemed to have sunk into post-
election obscurity but "Victim's Rights Week" (April 13-19, 1997)
has generated renewed interest.415
On the other hand, enduring post-Bill of Rights amendments
all protect procedural rights. Several deal with the franchise,416 to
protect and open political processes to all citizens on an equal
basis.417 Others also provide representational safeguards, through
electoral qualifications, 418 compensation of members,41 9 popular elec-
tion process, 420 presidential succession,421 and presidential term lim-
its. 422 Thus, the United States Constitution is distinguished as pro-
412. 142 CONG. REC. H3256, H3258 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Moakley) (the Constitution is "no place for political theater").
413. Id. at H3260 (statement of Rep. Beilenson). Ironically, although internal House
rules were changed during the 104th Congress to require a three-fifths vote for tax
increases, the rule was waived every time the issue came up. See id. at H3258.
414. See John Harris, Clinton Backs Crime Victims' Amendment, WASH. POST, June
26, 1996, at Al (reporting that President Clinton supports a victims' rights amendment,
although he has rejected other proposals to amend the Constitution); Editorial, Tinkering
with the Constitution, WASH. POST, June 26, 1996, at A20 (suggesting that the amendment
had the backing of both parties' presidential candidates simply because of its "political
irresistibility" during an election year).
415. See Kyl's Victims' Rights Amendment Gets Senate Judiciary Hearing, Press
Release, Apr. 16, 1997 (noting that Attorney General Janet Reno had testified in support
of the Amendment, which would, among other things, allow victims to be present at
judicial proceedings in their case and be told of the offender's release or escape). For a
more critical view of proposal, see Stephen Chapman, Constitutional Clutter: The Wrongs
of the Victims' Rights Amendment, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 20, 1997, at A21.
416. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
417. See ELY, supra note 295, at 99.
418. See U.S. CONST. amends. XVII, XXIII.
419. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
420. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII; see also amend. XIV.
421. See U.S. CONST. amends. XX, XXV.
422. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. There have been numerous proposals to impose
congressional term limits through constitutional amendment. See John E. Yang, Term
Limits Fail Again in the House, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1997, at Al. Recently, in the wake
of abuses that occurred during the 1996 elections, another proposal that would provide
procedural safeguards-campaign finance reform-has gained widespread momentum,
more or less across party lines. See Stephen Green, Constitutional Amendment Sought for
Campaign Reform, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 26, 1996, at A2.
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viding a "process of government, not a governing ideology"; 423
otherwise, it would not survive through the ages. By ensuring
adequate process and "a durable structure for the ongoing resolu-
tion of policy disputes"' 424 the Constitution protects representational,
republican democracy. The guarantees of life, liberty, and happi-
ness are assured "not by trying to define them for all time, but
rather by attending to the government processes by which their
dimensions would be specified over time.' 425
In sum, instead of creating a new substantive right, an amend-
ment that protects public participation and full and complete de-
liberation and accountability in the legislative process, particularly
with respect to issues that are subjected to extreme political and
economic pressures, such as environmental protection, would be
more consistent with the spirit and structure of the Constitution,
2. A Process-Based Constitutional Amendment Prohibiting
Substantive Legislation by Appropriation Would Be the Most
Effective Solution
The Constitution protects fundamental values through proce-
dural protections that ensure that "in the making of substantive
choices the decision process will be open to all on something
approaching an equal basis, with the decisionmakers held to a duty
to take into account the interests of all those their decisions af-
fect. ' 426 However, the procedural protections of representative gov-
ernment have broken down in recent decades. The nation's political
system currently
reflects an emphasis on expediency and a failure to nurture our
capacity for self-determination. We have not paid adequate
attention to the serious problems undermining the account-
ability of government and the confidence citizens have in it ....
[I]n order to redeem the promise of democratic government, we
must make all these [governmental] institutions more account-
able.427
423. ELY, supra note 295, at 101.
424. Id. at 90. Indeed, its very impetus was that the colonists were not being
adequately represented in Parliament. See id. at 89.
425. Id. at 89.
426. Id. at 100.
427. GORE, supra note 39, at 180-81.
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The case for a process-oriented right to protect the environ-
ment is particularly compelling under the representational demo-
cratic framework of the United States. "The largest promise of the
democratic idea is that, given the right to govern themselves, free
men and women will prove to be the best stewards of their own
destiny . . . . But now a new challenge-the threat to the global
environment-may wrest control of our destiny away from us." 428
It is generally recognized that due process rights-access to
information, education, participation, recourse, and sanctions-are
a necessary component of maintaining a decent and sustainable
environment.429 Access to information is the bedrock upon which
participatory rights are founded. Indeed, "'informed public opinion
is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment."' 430 With
regard to environmental issues:
Unrestricted public access to adequate information is a condi-
tion sine qua non to the participation by everyone in the
protection and improvement of the environment. Without appro-
priate data, the general public cannot answer the following very
fundamental question: is the environment clean and balanced or
not?431
428. Id. at 276-77. The deprivation of choice and, consequently, self-destiny,
impairs a fundamental interest: "[e]ach generation exercises power over its successors: and
each, in so far as it modifies the environment bequeathed to it. . . limits the power of its
predecessors." Sax, supra note 81, at 102 (citing C.S. LEwis, THE ABOLITION OF MAN
36-37 (1947)). "The impoverishment of the earth and its resources limits the choices
available to future generations, and makes future human beings 'the patients of ... [our]
power."' Id. at 103 (citing LEwis, supra).
429. See Janusz Symonides, The Human Right to a Clean, Balanced, and Protected
Environment, 20 INT'L J. L. INFO. 24, 29-37 (1992). In the international forum, although
substantive environmental rights have not been recognized, "regional and international
human rights bodies are developing a practice whereby the procedural bases for enforcing
the right to a satisfactory environment are becoming more firmly established" UNITED
NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNSEL, SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DIS-
CRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
SECOND PROGRESS REPORT PREPARED BY MRS. FATMA ZOHRA KSENTINI 37, 123, U.N.
Doe. EICN.4/Sub.2 (1993) (emphasis added).
430. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (citing Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
431. Symonides, supra note 429, at 29. The consideration and exchange of environ-
mental information is anticipated by a number of international agreements. See, e.g.,
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, art. IX
(2), S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-10 (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1541, (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989);
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Envi-
ronment and Development, Prine. 17, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 151/PC/WG.III/Rev. 1 (1992)
(declaring that "environmental impact assessments . . . shall be undertaken for proposed
activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment").
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Information alone, however, is not enough. Individuals must
be provided with "both the information to comprehend the enor-
mity of the [environmental] challenge and adequate political and
economic power to be true stewards of the places where they live
and work."432 Such stewardship necessarily requires the availability
of appropriate political tools, including the opportunity to partici-
pate meaningfully through our elected representatives. 433
In a broader sense, use of the appropriations power to establish
public policy-environmental and otherwise-and to circumvent
the long-term priorities of the public has undermined meaningful
representation and seriously corrupted the political process, to the
extent that it is no longer deserving of the citizenry's trust.434
Accordingly, an amendment to protect participatory rights in rep-
resentational government, which would prohibit the enactment or
waiver of substantive legislation through the abbreviated budget
process,435 warrants consideration as a possible solution. 43 6
This Article does not purport to define the proposed amend-
ment in detail, and instead takes the position that a process-
oriented amendment deserves further consideration. As a starting
point, a constitutional provision could require all appropriations
432. GORE, supra note 39, at 277.
433. Senator Leahy noted that American citizens have the right to participate and
express their interest in the management of public lands, and that the Senate should not
accept a provision that denies this right. See 141 CONG. REc. S4876 (daily ed. Mar. 30,
1995).
434. Malfunction in democracy occurs "when the process is undeserving of trust."
ELY, supra note 295, at 103. In fact, mistrust of state assemblies, where bribery and
corruption were frequently the norm, resulted in the amendment or incorporation of
provisions in many state constitutions that restrict the content of appropriations bills to
non-substantive, budgetary matters. See Zielske, supra note 297, at 742 & n.7.
435. State courts have struggled with the interpretation of anti-rider provisions; for
example, the distinction between substantive and non-substantive measures has not been
clearly defined. See Zielske, supra note 297, at 745-46 (detailing judicial interpretations
of Pennsylvania provision that states that general appropriations bills "shall embrace
nothing but appropriations for the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the
Commonwealth, for the public debt and for public schools:').
436. Without doubt, some will continue to argue that process alone is not enough
to ensure environmental protection. Professor Sax has concluded that the implicit principle
underlying the procedural mandate of NEPA-that federal programs would become less
environmentally damaging when agencies are required to consider alternatives and publicly
describe adverse environmental effects-has not been fulfilled. See Joseph L. Sax, The
(Unhappy) Truth about NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239 (1973). But see Hungerford, supra
note 62, at 1433-34 (arguing that the issuance of the Northwest Forest Plan in response
to the spotted owl injunctions provides evidence that NEPA has influenced environmental
policy in far-reaching ways, by forcing the executive branch to rethink public lands
management).
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measures to be germane to the spending bill under consideration,
consistent with existing law, and limited to the life of the appro-
priations bill itself. 437 In addition, an amendment should likely
include a provision to allow for waiver, perhaps by a supermajority
of both houses of Congress, in case of actual emergency.438 The
experience of states that do have constitutional prohibitions on
riders is a plausible place to look for guidance.439
VII. CONCLUSION
Fundamental constitutional change is justified when special
interest factions have successfully and repeatedly manipulated the
political structure to pursue their own narrow interests, as a small
group of extractive resource users has done in recent years. It is
justified when "ordinary irresponsibilities of normal politics ...
begin to offend in a special way,"440 as is the case when elected
representatives routinely manipulate the legislative process to co-
erce the executive branch to forego its veto authority, or to take
action contrary to directives from the judiciary, thereby eroding
constitutional checks and balances. It is justified when judicial
review is severely curtailed by appropriations riders. The assault
on the public interest and the environment has precipitated a con-
stitutional crisis. A collective effort to renew and redefine the pub-
lic good by fine-tuning the legislative process is in order.
437. See Zielske, supra note 297, at 742-745 (discussing the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution).
438. See Devins, supra note 277, at 459.
439. States have long been considered "laboratories of democracy," a conception
particularly relevant in this area. See Briffault, supra note 314, at 1171; see also supra
note 268 (providing a partial list of state constitutions that include limitations on riders).
In interpreting their own constitutions, state courts have gained substantial experience with
the difficulty of giving content to terms like "germaneness" and distinguishing between
"substantive" and "non-substantive" measures. See Zielske, supra note 297, at 745-46.
440. Ackerman, supra note 339, at 1040.
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